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VOTER PRIMACY
Sarah C. Haan*
This Article argues that Citizens United v. FEC expanded the audience
for campaign finance disclosure to include a group that had never before
been held relevant to campaign finance disclosure—corporate
shareholders—and explores the constitutional, policy, and political
consequences of this change. In part IV of Citizens United, the U.S.
Supreme Court departed from more than thirty years of campaign finance
disclosure analysis to treat corporate shareholders as a target audience for
corporate electoral spending disclosure, holding that the governmental
interest advanced by campaign finance disclosure laws includes an interest
in helping corporate shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s
political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making profits.”
Commentators have failed to appreciate the significance of this part of the
opinion, which was joined by eight of the Court’s nine Justices.
The Court’s expansion of the audience for compelled corporate
campaign finance disclosure is unlikely to lead to expanded disclosure; to
the contrary, it is likely to result in less disclosure of corporate political
spending, and particularly in less disclosure that is useful to voters. To
explain why, this Article compares voters’ and shareholders’ informational
interests in corporate campaign finance disclosure. It then explores
potential consequences of the Court’s move to repurpose corporate
campaign finance disclosure to serve the informational needs and interests
of shareholders. After Citizens United, the main governmental interest that
can justify campaign finance disclosure laws is an informational interest,
and several Justices on the current Supreme Court believe that voters lack
legitimate informational interests in some kinds of electoral spending
disclosure. Shareholder informational interests offer an alternative
justification for laws that compel disclosure by corporate electoral
spenders. In the coming years, the Court’s assessment of the relative merits
of voters’ and shareholders’ interests in disclosure information may well
determine the form and content of that disclosure. By clarifying the
differences between a “voter primacy” and a “shareholder primacy”
approach to corporate spending disclosure, this Article lays bare the
consequences of choosing one over the other.

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law. I would like to thank
Richard Seamon and participants in the 2014 National Business Law Scholars Conference,
the 2014 Inland Northwest Junior Scholars Conference, and the 2014 Rocky Mountain
Junior Scholars Conference for their valuable feedback on early drafts.
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INTRODUCTION
In corporate law, “shareholder primacy” describes the theory that a
corporation best achieves its objectives through mechanisms, like
shareholder voting, that ensure the preeminence of shareholder interests.1
Shareholder primacy began as an economic idea about capital formation
and risk2 and has grown over several decades into a broader ideology about
whose interests should dominate the corporate enterprise.3 Today, virtually

1. See, e.g., Ian B. Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder
Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 533, 535 (2006) (defining it as the “view that managers’
fiduciary duties require them to maximize the shareholders’ wealth and preclude them from
giving independent consideration to the interests of other constituencies”); Lynn A. Stout,
Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1189
(2002) (defining it as “the view that the corporation exists only to make money for its
shareholders”).
2. See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF CORPORATE LAW 67–70 (1991).
3. For a recent example, see Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751
(2014) (holding that shareholders’ religious preferences control the corporation’s religious
“exercise” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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all questions of corporate and securities law are evaluated by lawmakers,
regulators, and courts through a shareholder primacy lens.4
An analogous principle exists in the legal framework governing political
elections. In this Article, I call this principle “voter primacy.” Voter
primacy is the idea that representative democracy best achieves its
objectives through mechanisms that give primacy to voters’ interests.5
Lawmakers, regulators, and courts have long understood voters to stand at
the center of the democratic enterprise and elections to facilitate voters’
crucial role in political self-determination. In the same way that corporate
law’s purpose is to maximize shareholder value, the purpose of election law
is, first and foremost, to facilitate and effectuate the sovereignty of the
people.
From the very origin of campaign finance disclosure laws, the U.S.
Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis took for granted that campaign
finance disclosure is for voters. Public disclosure of campaign finance
information is justified, the Court has written, because disclosure is useful
to voters.6 It helps voters decide how to vote, and it helps them monitor
elected officials for evidence of improper influence after they are elected.
However, in 2010, in Citizens United v. FEC,7 the Supreme Court
departed from its longstanding voter primacy approach to campaign finance
disclosure. When challenged on First Amendment grounds, campaign
finance disclosure laws are subject to “exacting scrutiny,” which requires
that a disclosure law be justified by a “sufficiently important” governmental
interest.8 Disclosure of outside spending—the only type of federal electoral
spending that a corporation can engage in—can be justified mainly by an
informational interest, and whether a particular disclosure law serves a
sufficiently important informational interest turns, under the Court’s
approach, on the value of the compelled disclosure to its audience. The
identity of the audience for a campaign finance disclosure law is integral to
the constitutional analysis of the law. Until Citizens United, campaign
finance disclosure had only voters as an audience, and thus the essential
constitutional question concerned the value of information disclosed to
voters, and to voters alone.
In part IV of Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens United, the
Court expanded the audience to include a second interest group, corporate
shareholders. The majority opinion devoted nearly as much analysis to
shareholders’ informational interests in corporate electoral spending
disclosure as it did to voters’ interests. In fact, the passage on this subject
mentioned shareholders’ and voters’ informational interests precisely the

4. Shareholder primacy is not without its critics. See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE
SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS,
CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC (2012).
5. These mechanisms include the First Amendment’s protection of a listener-focused
marketplace of ideas.
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66–67 (1976).
7. 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
8. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65–66.

2658

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

same number of times, and shareholders’ interests were listed ahead of
voters’ interests twice, while voters’ interests were listed ahead of
shareholders’ interests only once.9 A careful textual analysis of the Court’s
language suggests that the Citizens United majority viewed shareholders’
informational interests in corporate electoral spending disclosure as nearly
as important as, if not equal to, those of voters.
The idea that campaign finance disclosure has, as a primary or even a
secondary purpose, the provision of a corporation’s financial information to
its shareholders, is a significant departure from the way that lawmakers,
regulators, and courts have long thought about the First Amendment
interests at stake in compelled campaign finance disclosure. In fact, in its
arguments defending the disclosure laws challenged in Citizens United, the
government never argued that the disclosure laws were justified in part by
shareholder informational interests.10 Neither of the parties mentioned
shareholders as an audience for campaign finance disclosure, probably
because the idea had no basis in the Court’s prior disclosure jurisprudence.
The Court appears to have acted on its own to identify a governmental
interest in the use of campaign finance disclosure to inform investors about
corporate spending, possibly borrowing selectively and without attribution
from an amicus curiae brief submitted in the case.11
The Court’s expansion of the constitutionally cognizable audience for
corporate electoral spending disclosure to include shareholders is a threat to
voter primacy and the democratic values that voter primacy embodies. This
is because the expansion of the audience for corporate electoral spending
disclosure is unlikely to provide a basis for expanding corporate electoral
spending disclosure itself; to the contrary, the recognition of shareholder
interests in corporate electoral spending disclosure is likely to justify a
decrease in corporate electoral spending disclosure, and particularly a
decrease in corporate disclosure that is useful to voters. Essentially,
Citizens United has undermined voter primacy by repurposing this type of
campaign finance disclosure to serve two competing audiences.
Moreover, because corporate shareholders as a group share certain
demographic characteristics that distinguish them from voters as a group,
the Court’s expansion of the audience for corporate electoral spending
disclosure is likely to have political consequences. For instance, it may
enhance political power for the very wealthy, since corporate shareholding
is strongly concentrated in top income groups. In addition, it may cause
geographic effects in state and local elections, because politically active
public companies are likely to have many more shareholders who are voting
citizens of certain communities than others. These political effects can be
predicted because a nexus exists between the identity of those whose
interests campaign finance disclosure laws are designed to serve and the

9. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–71.
10. See infra Part I.B.2.
11. See infra Part I.B.2.
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identity of those who can use disclosure most effectively to advance their
political interests.
What is more, the Court’s move to expand the audience for corporate
electoral spending disclosure may ultimately undercut the constitutional
basis for campaign finance spending disclosure that provides “source
revelation” to voters.12 Source revelation involves public disclosure of the
identities of those who provide financial support to a candidate for public
office. Since the earliest disclosure laws were written, campaign finance
disclosure has been understood to be valuable to voters because it allows
them to draw conclusions about a candidate from the identities of those who
give her financial support.13 The Court’s endorsement of source revelation
in Buckley v. Valeo14 reflected its normative view that voters should draw
such conclusions.15 Today, disclosure opponents reject source revelation
and argue that voters should make voting decisions based upon the merits
of the candidates’ positions rather than upon the identity of their
supporters.16
In Citizens United and subsequent cases, the five-Justice majority has
signaled only weak support for voter interests in disclosure based on source
revelation, and some of those five Justices have disavowed source
revelation altogether.17 This suggests that shareholder informational
interests, which are not based on source revelation, provide the only
common basis for justifying corporate campaign finance disclosure, and
thus may take on increased analytical importance.
Shareholder
informational interests are not based on source revelation because
shareholders do not care about the identities of a particular candidate’s
financial backers; they want to know what a specific corporation is doing
with its money. Any shift in the balance of interests that justify corporate
electoral spending disclosure away from voters’ interests in source
revelation in favor of shareholders’ interests in financial oversight has a
meaningful consequence. If corporate electoral spending data ever became
available through a different disclosure channel—for example, through
federal securities regulation—a key governmental interest justifying
campaign finance disclosure of corporate expenditures would become
vulnerable to challenge as costly and redundant.
The Court’s disclosure analysis in Citizens United must be understood as
part of a broader trend related to corporate disclosure. In this trend,
securities disclosure, which traditionally has been investor focused,
12. See Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information
Tradeoff, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1863 (2013) (coining the phrase “source revelation”).
13. See, e.g., Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67.
14. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
15. See id. at 66–67.
16. See, e.g., Benjamin Barr & Stephen R. Klein, Publius Was Not a PAC: Reconciling
Anonymous Political Speech, the First Amendment, and Campaign Finance Disclosure, 14
WYO. L. REV. 253, 285 (2014) (suggesting that “an organization’s desire for the public to
focus solely on its message is more important than the public’s interest in knowing who is
behind it”).
17. See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 238–39 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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increasingly is being used to provide information to the general public.18
Securities law commentators have recently raised concerns about the
repurposing of investor-focused disclosure for other audiences,19 and SEC
Chairwoman Mary Jo White has suggested that securities disclosure should
not stray from its “core purpose”: providing investors with information
useful for investment decision making.20 At the same time, other disclosure
laws—like campaign finance disclosure laws—are being reimagined as
channels for provision of investor information. In all cases, a change in the
disclosure audience has significant implications for the content and manner
of disclosure, and ultimately for the value of the disclosure for all potential
audiences.
Election-related disclosure laws mandate, among other things,
registration and termination filings, recordkeeping, disclaimers, reporting,
and public disclosure. Registration and termination requirements obligate a
subject to register its identity and/or intentions with the government.
Recordkeeping rules require a subject to maintain financial and other
records that may be audited or examined by the government. Disclaimer
requirements mandate that a subject identify itself as the source or author of
an ad in the ad itself. Reporting laws compel the subject to report
information about itself or its donors—including contribution and
expenditure figures—to the government.
Disclosure of corporate outside spending (independent expenditures and
electioneering communications) reveals how much a corporation has spent
to support or oppose an electoral cause. In some state and local elections,
corporations also may make donations directly to candidates
(“contributions” in the jargon of election law). This Article uses the term
“corporate electoral spending disclosure” to include both categories of
corporate spending. By the Supreme Court’s logic in Citizens United, any
sort of campaign finance disclosure that reveals the amount of money spent
by a corporation in an electoral contest or ballot initiative would advance
the informational interests of the corporation’s shareholders.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes how, in the lead-up
to Citizens United, the parties in election law disputes and the Supreme
Court itself spent more than thirty years analyzing the government’s
informational interest in campaign finance disclosure as if it involved the
provision of information exclusively to voters. Part I then shows how the
18. Examples include: the Board Diversity Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(2)(vi) (2013);
the proposed CEO-Pay Ratio Rule, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 953, 124 Stat. 1376, 1903–04 (2010); the Resource
Extraction Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13q-1 (2013); the Conflict Minerals Rule, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13p-1 (2013); and the Mining Safety Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 229.104 (2013).
19. See, e.g., Karen E. Woody, Conflicts Minerals Legislation: The SEC’s New Role As
Diplomatic and Humanitarian Watchdog, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1339 (2012) (arguing
that the Conflict Minerals Rule “will force companies to provide nonmaterial information to
investors and the public,” and thus “is problematic from both a securities law standpoint and
a public international law standpoint”).
20. Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, The Path Forward on Disclosure, The Harvard Law
School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation (Oct. 15, 2013), available
at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370539878806#.VNk0ZVPF9XZ.
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Court’s controversial 2010 opinion in Citizens United broke from this
precedent to treat corporate shareholders as a constitutionally cognizable
audience for campaign finance disclosure for the first time. It analyzes the
key disclosure passage in the majority opinion, and makes some guesses
about where the Court’s ideas about shareholder informational interests in
campaign finance disclosure originated—considering that no party in the
case had raised or discussed the idea. It describes how Citizens United and
subsequent cases have weakened voters’ informational interests in source
revelation, which is likely to mean that future governmental justifications
for corporate electoral spending disclosure will rely more heavily on
shareholders’ informational interests. Finally, Part I describes how the
Court’s endorsement of a shareholder audience for campaign finance
disclosure in Citizens United has influenced legislatures’ and courts’ views
about the purpose of campaign finance disclosure since the case was
decided, and argues that this threatens to meaningfully change the way that
we understand what corporate campaign finance disclosure is supposed to
do.
Part II contends that the Court’s endorsement of a new shareholder
audience for corporate campaign finance disclosure is not likely to lead to
more disclosure; to the contrary, it is likely to result in less corporate
disclosure, and particularly less disclosure that is useful to voters. This is
true because voters’ and shareholders’ informational interests in corporate
campaign finance disclosure are often in opposition; the two are,
essentially, competing audiences with conflicting interests in the content
and manner of corporate electoral spending disclosure. Part II identifies
and explores four specific points of tension between the informational
interests of voters and shareholders in corporate electoral spending
disclosure.
Part III explores the implications of these conclusions. It unpacks the
politics of the audience by outlining the main demographic differences
between the typical voter and the typical shareholder. It concludes that
even a partial refocusing of disclosure priorities away from the interests of
voters toward those of shareholders will have political consequences. First,
it is likely to privilege the political interests of the very wealthy—including
not only wealthy Americans, but also wealthy foreigners, who own more
than 10 percent of U.S. stocks—at the expense of the interests of lowerincome Americans. Second, because shareholders of public companies
reside in certain geographic areas in greater concentrations than in others, it
will lead to geographic effects in state and local elections. Thus corporate
political activity will be influenced by shareholders’ civic interests in some
places but not others. Finally, this part argues that the Court’s newfound
reliance on shareholder informational interests to justify campaign finance
disclosure laws ultimately leaves some types of compelled disclosure—
particularly spending disclosure that provides voters (but not shareholders)
with source revelation—vulnerable to challenge on First Amendment
grounds.
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I. CITIZENS UNITED REPURPOSES
CORPORATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE
For most of modern U.S. history, voters were understood as the exclusive
audience for compelled campaign finance disclosures. This part briefly
traces the informational interest as a constitutional basis for compelled
campaign finance disclosure from Buckley v. Valeo to Citizens United v.
FEC, focusing on the question of audience. Before Citizens United, the
possibility that corporate shareholders might be a separate, constitutionally
cognizable audience for compelled corporate disclosure did not occur to the
Court, even though Congress had been debating the problem of the
dissenting shareholder since the early twentieth century, corporations were
parties in election law cases before the Court, and the Court routinely was
called upon to analyze the governmental interests served by laws that
compelled disclosure by corporations. Potentially strong shareholder
informational interests lurked in the shadows of several disclosure-related
cases leading up to Citizens United, but they were never taken up or
analyzed. In fact, the first time the issue of shareholders’ informational
interests was ever mentioned in a Supreme Court opinion was 1990, in a
footnote in Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Austin v. Michigan State
Chamber of Commerce.21 In that footnote, Justice Brennan took for granted
that corporate shareholders received corporate spending information, and
merely questioned its usefulness. Thus, when the Court endorsed the idea
that shareholders are a constitutionally cognizable audience for compelled
corporate spending disclosure in Citizens United, it was forging new
ground.
A. Buckley v. Valeo and Its Progeny
The exacting scrutiny standard—which requires a government to
successfully argue that a law challenged on First Amendment grounds
serves a “sufficiently important” governmental interest—was first applied
by the Supreme Court to compelled campaign finance disclosure in its
iconic 1976 opinion, Buckley v. Valeo.22 In Buckley, the Court upheld
portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 197123 (FECA), including
several recordkeeping and reporting provisions, against a First Amendment
challenge.24
21. 494 U.S. 652, 674 n.5 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. 424 U.S. 1, 66 (1976).
23. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (codified at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101–30126, 30141–
30145).
24. FECA required “political committees” to maintain records of contributors donating
more than $10, and to file quarterly reports with the Federal Election Commission (FEC)
that provided the name, mailing address, occupation, and principal place of business of any
person who contributed more than $100 in a calendar year. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 63–64.
Individuals or organizations that spent more than $100 in a calendar year were required to
file a report directly with the FEC. Id. The parties challenging FECA argued that these
provisions were unconstitutionally overbroad insofar as they required recordkeeping and
reporting related to minor party and independent candidates, of contributions of as little as
$11, and of independent expenditures. Id. at 60–61.
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In its analysis of FECA’s disclosure provisions, the Buckley Court
acknowledged that compelled campaign finance disclosure can infringe
First Amendment rights, but explained that “there are governmental
interests sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility of infringement,
particularly when the ‘free functioning of our national institutions’ is
involved.”25 The Court then identified “three categories” of governmental
interests “of this magnitude” that supported compelled campaign finance
disclosure.26 The first and, in the Court’s analysis, the most important, was
the “informational interest.”27 The Court wrote:
[D]isclosure provides the electorate with information “as to where
political campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the
candidate” in order to aid the voters in evaluating those who seek federal
office. It allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum
more precisely than is often possible solely on the basis of party labels
and campaign speeches. The sources of a candidate’s financial support
also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most likely to
be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in
office.28

The Court’s language unambiguously identified “the electorate” and
“voters” as the constitutionally cognizable audience for compelled
campaign finance disclosure.29 Buckley did not acknowledge other
audiences for campaign finance disclosure, including corporate
stakeholders, the media, scholars, business competitors, or candidates
themselves, as relevant to First Amendment analysis.
The critical idea behind Buckley’s analysis of FECA’s disclosure
provisions was that voters use campaign finance information to make
voting decisions. The Court’s analysis was voter-centric, looking at each
disclosure requirement from the perspective of a voter evaluating

25. Id. at 66 (quoting Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
97 (1961)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 81.
28. Id. at 66–67 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 92-564, at 4 (1971)).
29. Id. The second category of governmental interest identified by the Court was an
anticorruption interest, but it, too, hinged on the disclosure of information to the citizenry,
and on citizens’ use of that information. Compelled disclosure “deter[red] actual corruption
and avoid[ed] the appearance of corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures
to the light of publicity.” Id. at 67. The Court explained that “[a] public armed with
information about a candidate’s most generous supporters is better able to detect any postelection special favors that may be given in return.” Id. Although the Court used the word
“public” in that sentence, its context makes it clear that the Court meant voters. The third
category of governmental interest supporting compelled campaign finance disclosure,
according to the Court, was an enforcement interest to detect violations of FECA’s
contribution limits. Id. at 67–68. In contrast to the first two categories of informational
interests, which were achieved through the provision of information to voters, this interest
did not require public disclosure, because data gathering and the detection of violations
could be done by authorities charged with enforcing campaign finance laws, like the FEC,
and because those authorities would ultimately enforce FECA. See Richard Briffault,
Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J. 273, 280 (2010).
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candidates.30 The Court upheld the direct reporting requirements of FECA,
which required individuals and organizations that engaged in direct
independent expenditures to file reports with the FEC, by defining the word
“expenditure” in the statute narrowly to cover only communications that
“expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly identified
candidate.”31 With this clarification, the Court held that the law served the
sufficiently important governmental interest of “increas[ing] the fund of
information concerning those who support the candidates.”32 The Court
clarified that the “informational interest can be as strong” with independent
expenditures as it is with contributions because “disclosure helps voters to
define more of the candidates’ constituencies.”33 The point was that source
revelation—the revelation of the identities of a candidate’s financial
supporters—is a key component of the informational interest.
Buckley laid the groundwork for all of the Court’s subsequent analysis of
the informational interests supporting compelled registration,
recordkeeping, disclaimers, and reporting, and it remains today the most
detailed elucidation of the informational interest. After Buckley, the
Supreme Court decided several First Amendment challenges to state and
federal laws that compelled election-related disclosures from individuals
and organizations. The Court’s disclosure-related opinions—including the
concurring and dissenting opinions—assumed that voters were the main
audience for compelled disclosure, and the exclusive audience from a First
Amendment perspective.34 This assumption made sense, because Buckley
viewed the main informational purpose of campaign finance disclosure as
revealing to voters the identities of a candidate’s financial backers. Implicit
in Buckley’s analysis of disclosure was the idea that information about a

30. For example, the Buckley Court observed that since “minor parties usually represent
definite and publicized viewpoints, there may be less need to inform the voters of the
interests that specific candidates represent.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 70. But, the Court noted, a
minor party candidate “may be encouraged by major-party interests in order to divert votes
from other major-party contenders.” Id. The Court suggested that a main way that voters
could learn about this diversion strategy was through the public disclosure of campaign
finance data. Id. at 71.
31. Id. at 80.
32. Id. at 81.
33. Id.
34. See, e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 196, 200 (2003) (quoting at length from
the district court’s description of how the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act’s (BCRA)
enhanced disclosure required corporations and unions “to reveal their identities so that the
public is able to identify the source of the funding behind broadcast advertisements
influencing certain elections,” and describing a “need to make the contents of parties’
disclosure statements available to curious voters in advance of elections” (quoting
McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237 (D.D.C. 2003) (internal quotation marks
omitted)), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Austin v. Mich. State
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 698 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing how
Michigan’s law “operate[d] to prohibit information essential to the ability of voters to
evaluate candidates”); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coal. for Fair Hous. v. Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290, 298 (1981) (assuming that “voters” were the audience for all disclosures required
by a Berkeley, California campaign finance ordinance).
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candidate’s financial backers—the candidate’s “constituenc[y]”—is highly
valuable to voters in deciding how to vote.35
In more than thirty years of post-Buckley campaign finance disclosure
cases, the Court did not consider the possibility that corporate shareholders
might have separate, constitutionally cognizable informational interests in
compelled campaign finance registration, recordkeeping, disclaimers, or
reporting. This is true even in cases in which corporations were parties.36
And it was true in cases in which aspects of the disclosure laws in question
advanced interests unique to corporate shareholders—such as advance
disclosure requirements, which compel disclosure about future corporate
expenditures potentially far enough in advance for dissenting shareholders
to use the procedures of corporate democracy to stop them.37 When
shareholder informational interests lurked in the background of election law
cases, the Supreme Court ignored them,38 and its analysis revealed that it
35. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 81.
36. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. at 298. At least one plaintiff in the
case was a for-profit corporation that had violated the Berkeley ordinance by donating more
than $250 to an electoral campaign. The corporation’s shareholders thus had a strong
interest in learning about the company’s donation, not only because of its expressive
significance but because it was illegal. See Brief of Appellants at 8, Citizens Against Rent
Control, 454 U.S. 290 (No. 80-737), 1980 U.S. S. Ct. LEXIS 1783. The shareholder
informational interest went unrecognized in the case.
37. See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 321 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (discussing disclosure rules that required corporate spenders to disclose executory
contracts to pay for election-related advertisements before the payments were made, thus
“revealing where ads are to be run and what their content is likely to be”); id. at 362
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing disclosure rules that required broadcast licensees to
disclose requests for broadcast time from purchasers, even in cases in which a request did
not result in an actual purchase). In Citizens Against Rent Control, Pacific Gas and Electric
Corp. (PG&E), filed an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme Court to oppose the Berkeley
campaign finance law on First Amendment grounds. See Brief of Pacific Gas and Electric
Company as Amicus Curiae at 33, Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290 (No. 80737), 1981 U.S. S. Ct. LEXIS 884. PG&E’s brief argued that the law violated voters’ right
to receive information to help them decide how to vote, but PG&E never acknowledged that
the law would have advanced its own shareholders’ ability to learn about its political
spending activities. Id. This was because the law would have prevented PG&E from
contributing more than $250 to campaign committees, but would have allowed PG&E to
“communicate directly with the electorate,” so long as it complied with disclosure laws.
Appellees Brief at 13, Citizens Against Rent Control, 454 U.S. 290 (No. 80-737), 1981 U.S.
S. Ct. LEXIS 881. Because Berkeley’s law encouraged direct and fully disclosed
independent expenditures by corporations like PG&E and the corporate plaintiff in the case,
it potentially advanced shareholders’ informational interests—but shareholder informational
interests were not asserted to justify the law. See also FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc.,
479 U.S. 238 (1986) (failing to consider that shareholder informational interests could have
provided a more streamlined rule of decision, because shareholders in for-profit corporations
possess unique, economically based interests in corporate PAC disclosures that members of
nonprofit corporations do not, and which could justify increased administrative burdens for
for-profit corporations but not for nonprofit corporations).
38. See, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007); Wis. Right to
Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 U.S. 410, 411–12 (2006) (taken together, increasing the types of
political ads that could be funded directly from corporate treasuries, with no discussion of
shareholders’ interests); Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999)
(ignoring how Colorado’s campaign finance disclosure law would have compelled the
disclosure of corporate spending information when corporations sponsored ballot initiatives);
Austin, 494 U.S. at 664 (focusing on whether, under the Michigan state law in question, for-
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consistently assumed that shareholders already had access to corporate
spending information.39
Justice Brennan was the first Supreme Court Justice to raise
shareholders’ informational interests in corporate electoral spending
disclosure, in a footnote in a concurring opinion in Austin.40 He noted that
“shareholders in a large business corporation may find it prohibitively
expensive to monitor the activities of the corporation to determine whether
it is making expenditures to which they object.”41 Yet Justice Brennan’s
choice of words suggests that he believed shareholders had access to
corporate spending information; he wondered merely if the cost to
shareholders of monitoring that spending information was worth it.
The Court’s voter primacy approach to campaign finance disclosure was
so strong that, in 1998, it held that voters could suffer an actionable
“informational injury” if the Federal Election Commission failed to
properly enforce campaign finance disclosure laws. In FEC v. Akins,42 the
Court held that a group of voters had standing to challenge the FEC’s
decision not to bring an enforcement action against a nonprofit corporation
for its violation of campaign finance disclosure laws, reasoning that the
voters’ injury “consists of their inability to obtain information” that was
subject to compelled disclosure under FECA.43 Akins’s recognition of
voters’ interest in receiving compelled campaign finance disclosure was
reciprocal to the government’s long-established interest in providing voters
with this information through compelled campaign finance disclosure.
Thus, in the lead-up to Citizens United, the Supreme Court had very
consistently, over more than three decades, treated voters as the exclusive
audience for compelled electoral disclosure as a matter of First Amendment
law. The Court’s voter-centric view of disclosure might have led it to
conclude that intermediaries, such as the media, constitute an important
audience for campaign finance disclosure insofar as they synthesize
disclosure data and communicate it to voters. Some election law scholars
have argued as much.44 Other audiences exist for campaign finance
disclosure, including academics, candidates and elected officials, and, for
profit corporations could circumvent campaign finance laws forbidding corporate
contributions and expenditures by “funneling money through the Chamber’s general
treasury,” while ignoring how this would hide corporate political expenditures from the
corporation’s own shareholders).
39. See, e.g., Austin, 494 U.S. at 687, 691 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 674 n.5 (Brennan, J. concurring).
41. Id. In his concurrence, Justice Brennan also assumed that shareholders would be
fully informed about the corporation’s political expenditures when he wrote, “the provision
in Michigan corporate law authorizing shareholder actions against corporate waste might
serve as a remedy for other types of political expenditures that have no legitimate connection
to the corporation’s business.” Id. at 678.
42. 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
43. Id. at 21. The FEC had argued that the injury to the voters’ informational interest
was so abstract and widely shared that it could not confer standing, but the Court disagreed,
observing that “the informational injury at issue here, directly related to voting, the most
basic of political rights, is sufficiently concrete and specific” that the voters could bring their
claim. Id. at 24–25.
44. See Briffault, supra note 29, at 288.
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corporate spenders, shareholders, creditors, and business competitors.45
The Court, however, never so much as hinted that the existence of these
other audiences might give rise to constitutionally cognizable informational
interests.
B. Citizens United v. FEC
In Citizens United v. FEC, the Supreme Court invalidated section 441b46
of FECA, which prohibited corporations from making “electioneering
communications” in connection with federal elections, but upheld
disclaimer and disclosure provisions of the same law.47 The legal analysis
of the Citizens United opinion comprised two parts: a main, “substantive”
part about section 441b’s ban on electioneering communications by
corporations, and a secondary part addressing disclosure. The Court’s
majority opinion reflected this division, devoting forty-eight pages to the
substantive part of the case, which reflected a contentious five-to-four split
among the Justices, overturned key election law precedent, and held
section 441b unconstitutional.48 The disclosure part of the case, part IV,
took up only six pages, reflected the agreement of eight Justices, and upheld
the challenged disclosure laws.49 Commentators have treated the first,
substantive part of Citizens United as the important part of the case, and the
last, disclosure-related part as a sidelight lacking significance.50
However, part IV of Citizens United should be understood as
pathbreaking in its own right: it expanded the constitutionally cognizable
audience for campaign finance disclosure to include a new group, corporate
shareholders. In the first, substantive part of the case, which overturned the
corporate electioneering ban, the Court’s analysis focused on the value of
electioneering speech to “the public” and to “voters.”51 However in part
IV, the Court’s analysis of the interests advanced by the reporting and
disclosure of corporate spending was meaningfully different. The Court
analyzed corporate spending disclosures as justified by bivalent
informational interests—those of both voters and shareholders. This was a
45. See, e.g., Scott M. Noveck, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Legislative
Process, 47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 75, 76 (2010) (discussing legislators as an important
audience for campaign finance disclosure).
46. The relevant statutes have since been transferred to 52 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq. (West
Supp. 2014). Section 441b is now located at 52 U.S.C. § 30118.
47. See generally Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
48. Id. at 319–66. Justices Kennedy, Roberts, Scalia, Alito, and Thomas joined in the
majority opinion as to the substantive speech prohibition.
49. Id. at 366–71.
50. See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 469–70 (7th Cir. 2012)
(“The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. FEC is best known for striking down
as an unconstitutional restriction of free speech the federal law that bans corporations and
labor unions from running campaign-related advertisements in the lead-up to an election.
That holding largely overshadowed another part of the decision upholding the same law’s
campaign finance disclosure provisions.” (citation omitted)).
51. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 354 (“By suppressing the speech of manifold
corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the Government prevents their voices and
viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on which persons or entities are
hostile to their interests.”).
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departure from the Court’s longstanding and well-established view that the
informational interest justifying campaign finance disclosure as a matter of
First Amendment law is concerned exclusively with voters’ informational
needs because of the role of voters in American democracy.
Citizens United, Inc. had created a ninety-minute film featuring
presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, which it released in the lead-up to
the 2008 presidential primaries.52 The company created two ten-second ads
and one thirty-second ad to promote the movie and wanted to distribute the
movie to digital cable subscribers via video-on-demand within thirty days
of the 2008 Democratic primary election. But the company was prohibited
from doing so by the ban on corporate electioneering communications. The
company brought suit, challenging both the corporate electioneering ban
and disclosure laws that applied to electioneering communications.53
Citizens United, Inc. lost both challenges in federal district court and, after
the Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1253,
Citizens United, Inc. appealed.54
After the first round of briefing and an oral argument before the Supreme
Court, which largely focused on the corporate electioneering ban, the Court
restored the case to the calendar for reargument and directed the parties to
submit new briefs on whether the Court should overrule Austin, the relevant
part of McConnell v. FEC,55 or both.56 The Court’s move to reframe the
case caused the disclosure issue to recede further into the background,
where it was overshadowed by the “substantive” question of whether the
First Amendment forbids government from prohibiting corporate outside
spending.
Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion. The government had
argued that several interests were advanced by the corporate electioneering
ban, including an anti-distortion rationale, an anticorruption interest, and a
shareholder protection interest.57 The Court explored the first two interests
at length and ultimately rejected both. It then turned to the asserted
governmental interest in shareholder protection. Giving the subject a mere
two paragraphs, the Court rejected shareholder protection as a basis for
prohibiting corporate electioneering communications and other independent
expenditures.58 Instead of a government “regulatory mechanism . . . based
on speech,” the Court concluded that corporations must regulate
themselves, “through the procedures of corporate democracy” imagined in
52. See Matthew Mosk, Now Playing: An Anti-Clinton Ad?, WASH. POST (Dec. 13,
2007, 10:15 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2007/12/now-playing-a-clintonattack-a.html.
53. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319–21.
54. See Citizens United v. FEC, 555 U.S. 1028 (2008) (noting probable jurisdiction);
Citizens United v. FEC, 530 F. Supp. 2d 274 (D.D.C. 2008).
55. 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
56. Citizens United v. FEC, 557 U.S. 932 (2009) (restoring case for oral argument).
57. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–62.
58. The Court did not view the governmental interest in shareholder protection as invalid
per se, but suggested that it swept too broadly. It observed that the shareholder protection
interest would “allow the Government to ban the political speech even of media
corporations,” which “[t]he First Amendment does not allow.” Id. at 361.
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First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.59 The “substantive” ban on
corporate outside spending was overturned.
Having concluded that corporations may not be prohibited from spending
on electioneering communications, the Court addressed the disclosure
requirements that would apply to them, which included both disclaimers in
the film and its advertisements, and public disclosure of how much money
Citizens United, Inc. spent to fund the film and its advertisements. In part
IV of the majority opinion, an eight-Justice majority upheld the challenged
disclaimer and disclosure provisions, concluding that they satisfied exacting
scrutiny.60 The Court affirmed that campaign finance disclosure laws were
subject to the exacting scrutiny standard, which requires the government to
identify a “‘sufficiently important’ governmental interest,” and a
“substantial relation” between the government interest and the compelled
disclosure.61 The Court then analyzed the disclaimer and disclosure
provisions separately and in a way that suggested that the target audiences
for each type of requirement were different.
1. The Disclaimers
The disclaimer requirements of section 311 of the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 200262 (BCRA) required that any televised electioneering
communication include, in a “clearly spoken manner,” certain information,
including the following statement: “_______ is responsible for the content
of this advertising.”63 In approving the constitutionality of the compelled
disclaimers, the Court rejected the view that movie ad disclaimers could not
promote the government’s informational interest because they were
“commercial.” The Court wrote that the disclaimers “‘provid[e] the
electorate with information,’ and ‘insure[s] that the voters are fully
informed’ about the person or group who is speaking.”64 The Court viewed
the disclaimers as targeting voters who watched the ads and did not discuss
59. Id. at 361–62 (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 794 (1978))
(internal quotation marks omitted). These reasons were “sufficient to reject this shareholderprotection interest,” the Court wrote, but it went on to argue that the law was both
underinclusive and overinclusive in protecting shareholders because the spending ban
applied, at most, sixty days before an election, and because it applied to nonprofit
corporations. Id. at 362. The Court explained that “a dissenting shareholder’s interests
would be implicated by speech in any media at any time.” Id.
60. Only Justice Thomas dissented from part IV of the Court’s opinion. Justice Thomas
did not address shareholder informational interests in his dissent, and instead based his
objection on “the ‘right to anonymous speech.’” Id. at 480 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting
McConnell, 540 U.S. at 276 (Thomas, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part,
and dissenting in part)).
61. See id. at 366–67 (majority opinion) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 66
(1976)).
62. Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified in scattered sections of 52 U.S.C.).
63. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366. In addition, section 311 required a communication
that the ad “is not authorized by any candidate or candidate’s committee,” and a display of
the name and address or website URL of the individual or organization that paid for the ad.
See id.; see also 52 U.S.C. § 30120 (West Supp. 2014).
64. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368 (citation omitted) (quoting McConnell, 540 U.S. at
196; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76).
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the possibility that corporate shareholders also might have viewed the ads
and found the disclaimers informative about their corporations’ spending.
Under the majority’s analysis, disclaimers were constitutionally justified
solely based on the government’s “sufficiently important” interest in
providing disclaimer information to voters.
2. The Spending Disclosures
The majority’s analysis of compelled spending disclosure was different.
BCRA section 201 required a person to file a disclosure report with the
FEC if its spending on electioneering communications exceeded a certain
threshold; the FEC publishes these spending reports on its public website.65
The disclosure report—FEC Form 9—required the spender to report
information about itself, including its name and address, and the identity of
anyone who exercised control over the spender, as well as details about its
disbursements (to whom it paid money, and how much) and the sources of
its funds (who donated money to the spender, and how much).66
Citizens United, Inc. had argued that section 201 served no informational
purpose as applied to its ads because the ads were “commercial”
advertisements, and the Court began its analysis there.67 The Court
observed that this argument was “similar to the argument rejected above
with respect to disclaimers,” and dismissed it again, observing that “[e]ven
if the ads only pertain to a commercial transaction, the public has an interest
in knowing who is speaking about a candidate shortly before an election.”68
Having rejected Citizens United, Inc.’s contention that no informational
interest can attach to a “commercial” advertisement, the Court wrote that
“the informational interest alone is sufficient to justify application of § 201
to these ads,” and stated that for this reason it would not consider other
interests asserted by the government.69 The Court then briefly considered
and rejected Citizens United, Inc.’s argument that the disclosure
requirements would chill its donations.70
Finally, the Court reached the crux of the matter: the informational
purpose of the compelled spending disclosures. In a lengthy passage
containing the most oft-quoted language from part IV, the Court provided a

65. See 52 U.S.C. § 30104(f). The law requires a spender to file a disclosure report if it
spends more than $10,000 on electioneering communications in a calendar year. See id.
§ 30104(f)(1).
66. See FEC FORM 9, 24 HOUR NOTICE OF DISBURSEMENT/OBLIGATIONS FOR
ELECTIONEERING COMMUNICATIONS, available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm9.pdf.
67. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 368.
68. Id. at 369. In previous campaign finance disclosure cases, the Court had sometimes
used the phrase “the public” to mean voters. See, e.g., supra note 34. Here, in light of the
Court’s discussion of shareholder interests in disclosure information two paragraphs later, it
is not clear whether the Court was using the term “the public” to mean the voting public (i.e.,
citizens) or was, instead, using it in a broader sense to mean the whole public (i.e.,
participants in the public capital markets).
69. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 369.
70. Id. at 370.
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detailed and specific view about who is informed by corporate campaign
finance disclosure, and for what purpose:
Shareholder objections raised through the procedures of corporate
democracy can be more effective today because modern technology
makes disclosures rapid and informative. A campaign finance system that
pairs corporate independent expenditures with effective disclosure has not
existed before today. It must be noted, furthermore, that many of
Congress’ findings in passing BCRA were premised on a system without
adequate disclosure. With the advent of the Internet, prompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their
positions and supporters. Shareholders can determine whether their
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in
making profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are “‘in the
pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests.” The First Amendment protects
political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react
to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This transparency
enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight
to different speakers and messages.71

The Court’s analysis made it clear that the informational interest supporting
compelled campaign finance reporting was no longer just about voters. The
Court had introduced corporate shareholders as a new, constitutionally
cognizable audience for campaign finance disclosure—specifically for
corporate spending disclosure—and had described shareholders’ interests in
spending disclosure as nearly as important as the interests of voters.
In a single sentence that followed this passage, the Court wrote that “[f]or
the same reasons we uphold the application of [the disclaimer and
disclosure provisions] to the ads, we affirm their application to” Hillary:
The Movie.72 Thus, the Court’s reasoning about shareholder interests was
incorporated into its analysis of compelled disclosure relating both to the
advertisements and to the film itself.
Justice Kennedy structured the key passage, quoted above, to present
shareholders’ and voters’ interests as if they hold nearly equivalent value in
the First Amendment analysis. The passage starts with shareholders’
interests, ends with voters’ interests, and invokes shareholder interests four
times—precisely the same number of times that it uses the word “voter” or
“electorate.” When the passage describes the informational purposes of
corporate electoral spending disclosure—the very heart of governmental
interest analysis under exacting scrutiny—it puts shareholders’ interests
before voters’ interests twice, observing first that “prompt disclosure of
expenditures can provide shareholders and citizens with the information
needed to hold corporations and elected officials accountable,” and then, in
the next sentence, that “[s]hareholders can determine whether their
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making
71. Id. at 370–71 (citations omitted) (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 259
(2003), overruled by Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310).
72. Id. at 371.
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profits, and citizens can see whether elected officials are ‘“in the pocket” of
so-called moneyed interests.’”73 That sentence is important; it reveals not
only the majority’s view that shareholders’ primary informational interest in
corporate spending disclosure is financial rather than expressive, but also its
view that voters’ primary informational interest in corporate electoral
spending disclosure relates to ferreting out influence, rather than to deciding
how to vote.74
The opinion puts voters’ interests ahead of shareholders’ interests only
once, in the next to last sentence in the paragraph, opining broadly that
“disclosure permits citizens and shareholders to react to the speech of
corporate entities in a proper way.”75 The final sentence breaks from the
bivalent language used above and seems, as an afterthought, to return voter
interests to the center of the disclosure enterprise.
The Court’s assertion that campaign finance disclosure serves to help
shareholders “determine whether their corporation’s political speech
advances the corporation’s interest in making profits” was the first time the
Court has ever suggested either that campaign finance disclosure laws serve
a corporate governance function—here, to monitor management and
thereby to reduce agency costs—or that campaign finance disclosure laws
should advance the private financial interests of a subset of Americans.76
As is explored in more detail in Part II, state and federal corporate laws
already give shareholders default informational rights, and other private law
mechanisms exist to enhance transparency and accountability of corporate
managers to shareholders. The Court’s move to expand the audience for
campaign finance disclosure to include shareholders introduced a new,
private purpose behind public campaign finance disclosure laws.
The Court’s sole focus on shareholders’ interest in promoting corporate
profit-making embedded in the Court’s analysis a particular view about
profit maximization as a purpose of corporate law. In this way, the Court
was essentially taking sides in a corporate law debate that rages to this day:
whether and to what extent the goal of corporate law is to maximize profit
for shareholders (including subsidiary questions about short-term profit
maximization versus long-term profit maximization).77
73. Id. at 370 (emphasis added).
74. The majority’s assertion that voters should use corporate spending disclosure to “see
whether elected officials are ‘in the pocket’ of so-called moneyed interests” is perplexing in
light of the majority’s conclusion, only pages earlier, that independent expenditures can
never give rise to corruption. Id. at 360 (“[I]ndependent expenditures do not lead to, or
create the appearance of, quid pro quo corruption. . . . Ingratiation and access . . . are not
corruption.”) Read together, these two parts of the opinion acknowledge that elected
officials can be “in the pocket” of corporations and suggest there is something wrong with
that—why else would voters want to determine if a candidate is in a donor’s pocket?—but
conclude that voters must use preference satisfaction at the polls, rather than law, to address
it.
75. Id. at 371 (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 370.
77. See, e.g., Stephen E. Ellis & Grant M. Hayden, The Cult of Efficiency in Corporate
Law, 5 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239, 240, 249 (2010) (critiquing shareholder wealth
maximization for promoting Pareto optimality as a normative value in corporate law).
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Strikingly, the government had never argued, in its briefs or at oral
argument, that shareholder informational interests were relevant to FECA’s
disclosure laws. The government’s briefs discussed shareholder interests
only in the context of the corporate electioneering ban, and the Court
rejected all of the government’s asserted interests in shareholder protection
in the first part of Citizens United.
It is possible that the Court’s endorsement of shareholder informational
interests in campaign finance disclosure was drawn from, or at least
influenced by, arguments made in the first of two amici curiae briefs filed
jointly by the Center for Political Accountability (CPA) and the Carol and
Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research (“Zicklin Center”) at
the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.78 This brief argued
that campaign finance disclosure serves the informational interests of
corporations themselves, as well the informational interests of corporate
shareholders and directors, emphasizing the value of campaign finance
disclosure for the corporation’s compliance program.79 Much of the brief’s
discussion concerned the value of disclosures by outside spending
organizations that accepted corporate donations and not disclosures made
by corporations themselves. The value of such disclosures to corporations
is quite different from the shareholder interests endorsed by the Citizens
United majority; the idea conveyed by the CPA-Zicklin Center brief is that
spending disclosures by outside spending groups can inform a corporate
donor about how the group has spent the corporation’s donation, and thus
allow the corporation to monitor the groups to which it donates money. If
the Court did borrow ideas about shareholder informational interests in
campaign finance disclosure from the CPA-Zicklin Center amicus brief, it
did not cite the brief in its opinion, and it offered no other attribution.80
78. In the first phase of Citizens United, the CPA and the Zicklin Center filed a joint
amicus brief focusing on the disclosure issue. See Brief of the Center for Political
Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research As
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL
476569 [hereinafter CPA-Zicklin Center, Original Brief]. After the Supreme Court asked
the parties to re-brief the case focusing on whether to overrule Austin and McConnell, the
CPA and the Zicklin Center filed a joint supplemental amicus brief that focused on the
corporate electioneering ban. See Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the
Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics Research at the Wharton School As
Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee on Supplemental Question, Citizens United, 558 U.S.
310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2349016 [hereinafter CPA-Zicklin Center, Supplemental Brief].
Both CPA-Zicklin Center briefs supported the corporate electioneering ban and the
challenged disclaimer and disclosure laws and urged the Court to uphold them.
79. Disclosure serves corporations’ informational interests, the CPA-Zicklin Center brief
asserted, because it “strengthens a corporation’s ability to monitor the use of its funds and
supervise employees and agents for compliance with its internal policies,” “remind[s]
corporations of their legal obligations when they engage with the public on political issues,”
and “enable[s] them to develop and sustain the compliance programs necessary to safely
navigate the terrain of campaign finance law.” CPA-Zicklin Center, Original Brief, supra
note 78, at 5–6.
80. If the majority opinion did derive its shareholder interest theory from the CPAZicklin Center brief, it misunderstood that brief. The CPA-Zicklin Center brief argued that
corporations, shareholders, and directors all have informational interests in campaign finance
disclosure, and asserted it that “[m]andatory disclosure enables shareholders to monitor the
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The significance of the Court’s reconceived audience for corporate
spending disclosure went unrecognized in several long dissents. Justice
Stevens critiqued the majority’s rejection of the shareholder protection
rationale in connection with the corporate electioneering ban, which he said
was done “on the ground that abuses of shareholder money can be corrected
‘through the procedures of corporate democracy’ and, it seems, through
Internet-based disclosures.”81 “Modern technology may help make it easier
to track corporate activity, including electoral advocacy,” he wrote, “but it
is utopian to believe that it solves the problem” that dissenting shareholders
lack meaningful tools to influence corporate political spending.82 In other
words, Justice Stevens’s critique suggested that shareholders’ interest in
learning about corporate spending is low because shareholders can do little
with that information. He explained:
Most American households that own stock do so through intermediaries
such as mutual funds and pension plans, which makes it more difficult
both to monitor and to alter particular holdings. . . . Moreover, if the
corporation in question operates a PAC, an investor who sees the
company’s ads may not know whether they are being funded through the
PAC or through the general treasury.
If and when shareholders learn that a corporation has been spending
general treasury money on objectionable electioneering, they can divest.
Even assuming that they reliably learn as much, however, this solution is
only partial. The injury to the shareholders’ expressive rights has already
occurred . . . .83

By pointing out that shareholders lack tools to prevent corporate spending
“[i]f” or “[e]ven assuming” they learn about it, Justice Stevens was getting
use of corporate funds for political activity and to exercise their right to object to uses of
which they disapprove.” Id. at 21. This suggests that expressive interests (rather than
financial interests) lay at the heart of shareholder interest in corporate political spending
data. Later, in language that Justice Kennedy seemed to echo in part IV, the CPA-Zicklin
Center brief explained that:
Disclosure provides shareholders with the information necessary to make informed
decisions, without restricting the corporation from engaging in political activity.
Shareholders can choose to use this information as they see fit—for example, they
may divest, or they may seek change from within. Without disclosure
requirements, however, shareholders lack the means to make that choice.
Id. at 22 (citation omitted). Justice Kennedy’s assertion that shareholders’ interest in
disclosure boils down to its use to “determine whether their corporation’s political speech
advances the corporation’s interest in making profits” did not come from the CPA-Zicklin
Center brief, however. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370. The CPA-Zicklin Center brief did
not characterize profit maximization as the main purpose of the corporation, and the CPAZicklin Center’s supplemental brief expressed caution about “the drive to maximize
shareholder profit,” arguing that it “leads corporations to seek to prevent or reduce
competition, to privatize public goods, and to minimize taxation.” CPA-Zicklin Center,
Supplemental Brief, supra note 78, at 8. There was, however, discussion of profit-making as
the main corporate objective during oral argument. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 53–
54, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 6325467.
81. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (quoting
id. at 370 (majority opinion)).
82. Id. at 477 (citation omitted).
83. Id.
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at the heart of the informational problem: shareholders might not learn
about objectionable spending. But Justice Stevens did not carry that insight
any further, or consider the implications of the Court’s view that campaign
finance disclosure should have, as a signal purpose, the provision of
corporate expenditure information to shareholders.
The majority in Citizens United missed something important: the
government’s interest in providing corporate spending information to
shareholders is an interest in shareholder protection, and the Court has
historically resisted shareholder protection as a basis for justifying the
regulation of elections under the First Amendment. If the Court had
recognized its disclosure analysis as endorsing shareholder protection, it
might not have been so quick to repurpose campaign finance disclosure for
a shareholder audience.
Shareholders in a corporation are essentially sidelined from management
and perform a monitoring role. A shareholder’s ability to effectively
monitor corporate management, and thus to reduce agency costs, depends
on the shareholder’s access to corporate information. A shareholder may
object to corporate political spending because it is wasteful or inefficient, or
on ideological grounds, or for some other reason; but to object to corporate
political spending the shareholder must first know about it. This requires
shareholders to have access to information about the corporation’s
expenditures. Thus, on a fundamental level, questions about shareholder
access to corporate spending information are about the protection of
shareholders, typically minority shareholders, from oppressive conduct by
other shareholders, or from disloyal conduct by managers.
Two years after Buckley, in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,84
the Court addressed for the first time the argument that a state’s interest in
shareholder protection could justify a law restricting speech protected by
the First Amendment. Although the case did not address compelled
disclosure—it concerned an outright ban on corporate spending—it
considered the interests of corporate shareholders in connection with the
corporation’s political spending. The Bellotti Court discussed at length the
problem of the “dissenting shareholder”—the idea that one or more
minority shareholders might oppose the corporation’s political spending on
ideological grounds—but took for granted that all shareholders would be
well-informed about the corporation’s political spending. Bellotti rejected
the shareholder protection rationale advanced by the State of Massachusetts,
famously opining that, “[u]ltimately shareholders may decide, through the
procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should
engage in debate on public issues.”85

84. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
85. Id. at 794. The Court found the law both underinclusive and overinclusive in the
way it purported to protect shareholders, id. at 787, which suggested, the Court wrote, that
Massachusetts’s legislature “may have been concerned with silencing corporations on a
particular subject.” Id. at 793. There was other evidence that Massachusetts’s legislature had
passed the law to help assure the passage of a specific income tax referendum.

2676

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 83

After Bellotti, the Supreme Court weakly embraced governmental
interests in shareholder protection in only two other election law disputes,86
and it had rejected a shareholder protection rationale in the first part of
Citizens United itself.87 In fact, at oral argument Chief Justice Roberts
three times described the government’s shareholder protection rationale as
one that “we have never accepted.”88 Moreover, the Court’s rejection of a
shareholder protection rationale to justify the corporate electioneering ban
in the first part of Citizens United undercut its earlier endorsement of the
rationale to justify FECA’s corporate contribution ban, because there is
little basis for protecting dissenting shareholders from corporate
contributions but not from corporate outside spending.89 Thus, the Court’s
endorsement of what amounts to a shareholder protection interest in the
disclosure of electoral spending information in part IV of Citizens United
appears out of step with the Court’s evolving view on shareholder
protection in election law.90 Because shareholder informational rights are
well understood to fall within the scope of state corporate law—at least for
companies that are not subject to federal securities law—the Court’s
endorsement of a disclosure justification turning on the provision of
information to shareholders in Citizens United embedded a potential
federalism problem in its approach.91
There was an additional twist to the Court’s disclosure analysis in
Citizens United. Although the Court discussed shareholder informational
interests as a primary justification for corporate campaign finance
disclosure, Citizens United, Inc. itself was a nonprofit corporation and had

86. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life,
Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 260–61 (1986) (noting that the Supreme Court had “acknowledged the
legitimacy” of the shareholder protection rationale “as to the dissenting stockholder and
union member” in two earlier cases about union spending, but finding it inapplicable to the
plaintiff in the case); FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982)
(endorsing a shareholder protection interest with no discussion); see also Austin v. Mich.
State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 659–60 (1990) (ignoring the government’s
asserted shareholder-protection interest in its analysis, and subtly disaffirming it by focusing
on whether corporate political spending has “little or no correlation to the public’s support
for the corporation’s political ideas” rather than on whether the use of the corporation’s
treasury funds lacks shareholder support).
87. See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
88. Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 80, at 61–64.
89. But see Richard Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban
43 (Columbia Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Grp., Working Paper No.
14-405, 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2475908.
90. At least one U.S. court of appeals has suggested that, following Citizens United, the
characterization of an interest as a “corporate governance” or “shareholder protection”
interest rather than a “shareholder informational” interest might be outcome-determinative in
an election law dispute. See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 600
(8th Cir. 2013).
91. The Court’s eagerness to embrace shareholder protection in the disclosure context
contrasted with the deference it had shown to federalism principles in other First
Amendment cases involving election laws. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
794–96 (1983) (subordinating a state’s interest in regulating presidential elections to the
“uniquely important national interest” involved).
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no shareholders.92 Moreover, because it earned no profits, the Court’s view
that the challenged disclosure laws were justified in part based on the
government’s interest in helping shareholders “determine whether their
corporation’s political speech advances the corporation’s interest in making
profits” was irrelevant to Citizens United, Inc.93 It had no “interest in
making profits” to be safeguarded or monitored by any party through the
use of public campaign finance disclosure. The Court’s endorsement of a
governmental interest that would apply to some corporations subject to the
law—but not to Citizens United, Inc. specifically—signaled approval of
that interest although it probably could not, on its own, have justified the
law’s application to Citizens United, Inc.94
But the Court’s discussion of shareholder informational interests in part
IV was not surplusage; it was necessary to make the first part of the case—
which overturned the corporate electioneering communication ban—
workable.95 The first, substantive part of Citizens United had stripped
regulatory authority over corporate outside spending from government,
holding that only shareholders can regulate this form of corporate speech.
However, because shareholders often lack basic information about the
corporation’s electoral spending, and cannot easily obtain it if they set out
to get it, the logic behind Citizens United’s theory of corporate political
speech was flawed. The key disclosure passage in part IV, and its
endorsement of shareholder informational interests in campaign finance
disclosure, reflected a patch job on a shaky analytical foundation.
Legal scholarship about Citizens United has neglected part IV, and the
significance of its discovery of shareholder informational interests in
campaign finance disclosure has gone unnoticed. The common insight of
legal scholars writing about the Court’s disclosure analysis in Citizens
United is that, by relying only on the informational interest to justify the
disclosure laws at issue in the case, Citizens United has greatly weakened
the other two interests that Buckley identified in support of disclosure—the
anticorruption interest and the enforcement interest—particularly with
regard to outside spending.96
92. See Supplemental Reply Brief for Appellant at 2, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S.
310 (2010) (No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2564711.
93. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370.
94. See FEC v. Nat’l Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207–08 (1982) (endorsing a
shareholder-protection rationale to justify the application of a campaign finance law to a
nonprofit corporation with no shareholders). See generally Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom
Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2844 (2011) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
95. See Paul S. Miller, Shareholder Rights: Citizens United and Delaware Corporate
Governance Law, 28 J. LAW & POLITICS 51, 77 (2013) (“The Court upheld the disclosure
requirements in BCRA § 203 because it believed those disclosure provisions were necessary
for corporate democracy to be effective.”).
96. See, e.g., Anthony Johnstone, Recalibrating Campaign Finance Law, 32 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 217, 227 (2014) (“Citizens United appears to further narrow the permissible
justifications for . . . disclosure requirements.”); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Disclosures About
Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV. 255, 258–59 (2010) (focusing on the informational interest
because, among other reasons, “the Court in Citizens United chose to rely solely on” it);
Daniel R. Ortiz, The Informational Interest, 27 J.L. & POL. 663, 665–66, 673 (2012) (arguing
that Citizens United “undermined two of Buckley’s three disclosure interests”).
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But if legal scholars have failed to notice that something important
happened in part IV, lawmakers and lower courts have not. In 2012, the
Rhode Island General Assembly amended the state’s campaign finance
disclosure laws with a declaration that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure” laws
can “further the rights of . . . shareholders.”97 A proposed federal law, titled
the Democracy Is Strengthened by Casting Light On Spending in Elections
(“DISCLOSE”) Act has, over several versions, attempted to address
shareholders’ informational interests, which have been repeatedly cited in
testimony in Senate hearings about the proposed law.98 In litigation,
shareholder interests are asserted by government lawyers to justify state
campaign finance disclosure laws, and courts are following the lead of
Citizens United by endorsing those shareholder informational interests.99
And while shareholders’ informational interests in campaign finance
disclosure were expanded in Citizens United, post–Citizens United cases
have continued to undercut voters’ informational interests in some types of
spending disclosure. The Court’s repurposing of corporate spending
disclosure must be understood in this light. In Doe v. Reed,100 decided
several months after Citizens United, the Supreme Court upheld the
Washington Public Records Act, which authorized public disclosure of
referendum petitions, against a First Amendment challenge. The State of
Washington had argued that two governmental interests justified the law:
97. Act of June 26, 2012, ch. 12-446, 2012 R.I. Pub. Laws, available at
http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/PublicLaws/law12/law12446.htm.
98. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 111-492, at 28 (2010) (“Requiring real-time, ongoing
disclosure of election expenditures, allows shareholders and the public to monitor the use of
corporations’ capital in the election context, and take whatever actions they want to
discipline such corporations if they are found to misuse their funds.”); The DISCLOSE Act
(S. 2516) and the Need for Expanded Public Disclosure of Funds Raised and Spent to
Influence Federal Elections: Hearing on S. 2516 Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin.,
103rd Cong. (2014) (statement of Heather K. Gerken, J. Skelly Wright Professor of Law,
Yale
Law
School),
available
at
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/
?a=Files.Serve&File_id=3383996b-7434-4fb7-a89a-f817400151b2; Dollars and Sense:
How Undisclosed Money and Post-McCutcheon Campaign Finance Will Affect 2014 and
Beyond: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Rules & Admin., 103rd Cong. (2014) (statement
of Trevor Potter, President & General Counsel of the Campaign Legal Center), available at
http://www.rules.senate.gov/public/?a=Files.Serve&File_id=0b21407e-fffc-4834-a823d09b56fae344.
99. See, e.g., Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 876
(8th Cir. 2012) (describing “disclosure-related interests” as, inter alia, “providing the
electorate and shareholders information concerning the source of corporate political
speech”); Nat’l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 57 (1st Cir. 2011) (“[I]n the case
of corporate or organizational speakers, disclosure allows shareholders and members to ‘hold
[them] accountable for their positions.’” (quoting Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 370
(2010)); W. Tradition P’ship v. Att’y Gen., 271 P.3d 1, 14–15 (Mont. 2011) (holding that the
challenged disclosure law “when read in the context of Montana’s overall campaign finance
scheme, expresses the legislature’s intent to provide citizens and shareholders with
information about sources of funds used in support of candidates and ballot issues”), rev’d
on other grounds sub nom. W. Tradition P’ship v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012); see also
Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 595 (8th Cir. 2013); Ctr. for
Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 470, 490 (7th Cir. 2012); Yamada v. Weaver,
872 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1028 (D. Haw. 2012); Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Smithson,
750 F. Supp. 2d 1020, 1025–26 (S.D. Iowa 2010).
100. 561 U.S. 186 (2010).
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(1) an interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process, and (2) an
informational interest.101 The Court concluded that Washington’s interest
in preserving the integrity of the electoral process was sufficient to satisfy
exacting scrutiny, and it did not analyze Washington’s informational
interest.102 Although the majority opinion never discussed Washington’s
asserted informational interest, both Justices Alito and Thomas, writing
separately, criticized voters’ informational interests in the disclosures at
issue in the case, suggesting that they do not support voters’ informational
interest in source revelation.103 In Justice Thomas’s view, for example,
“People are intelligent enough to evaluate the merits of a referendum
without knowing who supported it.”104 Logically, of course, this argument
would apply broadly to voters’ interest in source revelation in other
disclosure areas, including disclosure of independent expenditures and
contributions. Because shareholders’ informational interests do not turn on
the value of source revelation, they lack this vulnerability.
More recently, the same five-member bloc of Justices from Citizens
United agreed that voters’ informational interests in the disclosure of
contributions are weak in relation to other interests. In McCutcheon v.
FEC,105 a slim five-to-four majority of the Court invalidated federal
aggregate contribution limits.106 Although McCutcheon did not involve a
challenge to any disclosure laws, the majority opinion discussed the
interests justifying compelled disclosure of contributions.107 Because
federal law prohibits corporations from making contributions, this sort of
disclosure involves no potential shareholder interests, and the Court did not
discuss shareholder interests. But the McCutcheon majority made clear that
the main governmental interest served by disclosure of contributions is an
anticorruption interest, not a more general informational interest in
providing spending information to voters.108
Thus, in just a few years, the Roberts Court has not only repurposed
corporate campaign finance disclosure to serve shareholders’ informational
interests, but has also signaled weakened support for the informational
interests of voters that turn on source revelation. Five of the nine Justices
agree that voters’ informational interest in disclosure of contributions is
secondary to their anticorruption interest, and two-fifths of the Court’s
conservative majority has rejected voters’ informational interests in
101. Id. at 197.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 206–08 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 239–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 239.
105. 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
106. Id. at 1442.
107. Id. at 1459–60.
108. The Court observed broadly that “disclosure requirements are in part ‘justified based
on a governmental interest in provid[ing] the electorate with information about the sources
of election-related spending.’” Id. at 1459 (emphasis added) (quoting Citizens United v.
FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 367 (2010)). But the Court emphasized a different rationale when it
discussed contribution disclosure specifically, writing that contribution disclosure
“minimizes the potential for abuse of the campaign finance system” and deters corruption
“by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.” Id.
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referendum spending disclosure. If the Court’s five-Justice majority
continues to undercut voters’ informational interests in campaign finance
disclosure, voters’ interest in learning the identities of candidates’ corporate
backers may take a back seat, as a matter of First Amendment doctrine, to
shareholders’ interest in learning about corporate political spending so as to
maximize corporate profits.
II. THE COMPETING INFORMATIONAL INTERESTS
OF VOTERS AND SHAREHOLDERS
Voters’ informational interests in corporate campaign finance disclosure
arise out of the essential role of the voter in a democracy. As Buckley put it,
“Democracy depends upon a well-informed electorate.”109 Citizens can use
disclosure to “give proper weight to different speakers and messages” in the
marketplace of ideas, to “make informed decisions” at the polls, and to
“hold corporations and elected officials accountable for their positions and
supporters” in various ways.110 Campaign finance disclosure is used by
voters to evaluate political arguments in the process of democratic
deliberation. It is also used for heuristic cues that, research suggests, are
effective shortcuts for helping voters decide how to vote.111 More broadly,
campaign finance disclosure helps voters understand the forces that shape
the institutions of our democracy.
The informational interests of corporate shareholders are different; they
primarily relate to a shareholder’s financial interest in a particular
investment. Shareholders care about corporate political spending because it
affects the value of their stock and involves the expenditure of money to
which shareholders have claim. Shareholders can use corporate spending
information to monitor management and reduce agency costs, and to
evaluate how effectively the company’s election-related expenditures
advance the company’s political interests, which serve the goal of
increasing shareholder value. Shareholders may assert expressive interests
in the corporation’s political spending, but these are measurable in terms of
In sum,
the shareholders’ financial interests in the company.112
109. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 n.55 (1976); see also Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S.
312, 349 (1991); Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 188 (1980); San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36 (1973) (“The electoral process, if reality is to conform to
the democratic ideal, depends on an informed electorate . . . .”).
110. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 370–71; see also Mayer, supra note 96, at 260 (“[I]t is
desirable for voters to be well-informed about their electoral choices . . . such that voters can
accurately determine and apply their personal preferences when making such choices.”).
111. See Michael S. Kang, Democratizing Direct Democracy: Restoring Voter
Competence Through Heuristic Cues and “Disclosure Plus,” 50 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1157–
59 (2003) (discussing interest group support as a heuristic cue).
112. A shareholder who owns half of a politically active corporation may object to all of
that company’s election-related spending but, under basic corporate law principles, only half
of that spending could be attributed in any sense to her financial interest in the company.
See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False
Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445, 477 (2008) (adopting this
assumption as to corporate costs). Even that attribution is a bit misleading; shareholders are
residual claimants of corporate assets, not the “owners” of money spent by the corporation or

2015]

VOTER PRIMACY

2681

shareholders’ informational interests in corporate spending disclosure are
financial in nature, even when they are influenced by civic-mindedness or
political ideology.
More fundamentally, voters want to limit the influence of business
donors on candidates and elected officials, and shareholders would like to
encourage that influence. In fact, from the shareholder perspective, it
would be optimal for a particular corporation, or even a particular industry,
to achieve complete legislative capture. This is because elected officials
can use government to create market inefficiencies that are bad for the
community as a whole, but that enrich the shareholders of specific
corporations. Thus, voters benefit from campaign finance disclosure
insofar as it reveals the influence of business donors on candidates and
elected officials, assuming voters can take action to limit that influence,
while a company’s shareholders can, in some circumstances, benefit when a
campaign finance disclosure regime functions to hide or obscure that
company’s political influence.
Because the nature of voters’ and shareholders’ interests in corporate
electoral spending information differ in these ways, their interests in
disclosure diverge as well. This part examines four key areas of
divergence, relating to both the content and manner of disclosure, as
examples of the competing informational interests at stake. These are only
examples; I have not attempted to produce a complete catalog of the
competing interests of voters and shareholders in campaign finance
disclosure. These four examples, however, clarify what may be gained and
what may be lost in campaign finance disclosure by expanding its audience
to include shareholders, and thereby enlarging its purpose to include
assisting shareholders in monitoring profit-making.
A. The “Materiality” of the Electoral Expenditure
Voters and shareholders are likely to ascribe importance to corporate
electoral spending at very different dollar thresholds. A voter cares about
corporate expenditure information when it matters to the voting decision,
and thus is likely to value disclosure of relatively small amounts of
spending. A shareholder’s interest in corporate expenditure information is
greatest when the expenditure is “material” to the shareholder’s
investment—that is, when the expenditure affects the value of the
shareholder’s stockholding on a company-by-company basis. This means
that the informational interests of voters and shareholders are of completely
different orders of magnitude. The desirable disclosure threshold for voters
will usually turn on the total amount of money spent on a specific electoral
contest, while the desirable disclosure threshold for shareholders will

of corporate property. See Margaret M. Blair, Corporate “Ownership”: A Misleading Word
Muddies the Corporate Governance Debate, BROOKINGS REV., Winter 1995, at 16–17;
Hayden & Bodie, supra, at 473; Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder
Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 804 (2007).
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usually turn on the amount spent by one corporation in proportion to that
corporation’s overall financial condition.
1. Voter Materiality
Voters’ interests in corporate political spending information are
determined by the “materiality” of the information to the voting decision
and to post-election monitoring of the performance of elected officials.
Fundamentally, voters’ interests favor public disclosure of most electoral
spending, including relatively small expenditures.113 This is because even
small expenditures can serve a useful information-signaling purpose,114 and
because voters may place a high value on the aggregation of spending data,
which is more accurate when it accounts for low-dollar spending. Small
corporate expenditures are particularly likely to interest voters in state and
local elections, where total electoral spending tends to be low, and in states
that allow corporations to donate directly to candidates.115
By providing source revelation, spending disclosure helps voters evaluate
candidates and campaign messages.116 Source revelation permits voters to
“place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely” than might
otherwise be possible;117 Michael Kang has written that spending
information constitutes uniquely “trustworthy” information that cuts
through the “cheap talk of campaign rhetoric,” in which candidates
sometimes benefit from cultivating ambiguity about their positions.118
Spending disclosure also can serve a simple “informational signaling”
function in which it provides voters with heuristic cues that help them
identify the interests likely to be served by a candidate or ballot
initiative.119 A voter who knows the political inclinations of a neighbor or a

113. See Archon Fung, Infotopia: Unleashing the Democratic Power of Transparency,
41 POL. & SOC’Y 183, 194 (2013) (arguing that “citizens must be able to know the identity of
social actors who seek to influence governance processes . . . and the character of their
political activities,” and advocating for “even fuller public disclosure” of political spending
by corporations and other organizations than already exists).
114. See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 570 (2012) (“[K]nowing a
candidate is backed by environmental groups or the gun rights lobby may be all you need to
know to cast a ballot consistent with your interests.”).
115. As of 2012, twenty-eight states permitted direct contributions to candidates from forprofit companies. Michael M. Franz, Past As Prologue: The Electoral Influence of
Corporations, in INTEREST GROUPS UNLEASHED 101, 121 (Paul S. Herrnson, Christopher J.
Deering & Clyde Wilcox eds., 2013).
116. See Gilbert, supra note 12, at 1862; Anthony Johnstone, The System of Campaign
Finance Disclosure, 99 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 143, 145 (2014).
117. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976).
118. See, e.g., Michael Kang, Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy, 97 MINN. L.
REV. 1700, 1703 (2013).
119. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 29, at 297; Kang, supra note 118, at 1714; Mayer,
supra note 96, at 262–63. Some legal scholars question the value of heuristic cues, and
disapproval of their use underlies some judicial skepticism about the value of campaign
finance disclosure for voters. See Kang, supra note 118, at 1718 (describing and discussing
commentators’ critiques).

2015]

VOTER PRIMACY

2683

business can use spending disclosure to determine which candidate or ballot
initiative is supported by the neighbor or business, and vote accordingly.
The aggregation of multiple, low-dollar expenditures may be particularly
useful to voters. As the Eleventh Circuit recently observed, “disclosure of a
plethora of small contributions” is useful to “inform voters about the
breadth of support for a group or a cause.”120 Voters may find it difficult—
and largely beside the point—to track a particular company’s spending
activity from year to year, because a company that existed last year may
exist this year in another form, or under another name. In many cases, more
can be learned by tracking aggregate spending by industry or by other
categories. Industry-wide spending is particularly revealing because
companies in the same industry are likely to have similar political
interests.121 For these reasons, voters’ interests in corporate spending data
do not turn exclusively on the amount of a particular corporation’s
expenditures. Rather, voters have strong informational interests in
aggregate data, and aggregate data is more accurate, and thus of greater use
to voters, when it includes all expenditures, including low-dollar spending.
Corporate spending information also may interest voters insofar as it
sheds light on the spending of individuals, such as a corporation’s managers
or employees. For example, it may interest voters to learn that a company’s
election-related spending is the same as or different from the electionrelated spending of its CEO.122 Such information may be particularly
revealing in a federal election, in which corporations are prohibited from
making direct candidate contributions, but CEOs are not.123 It might also
interest voters to learn that a corporation has given financial support to a
cause its employees oppose. If voters are interested in comparing a
corporation’s electoral expenditures with the donations of its CEO or
employees, the size of the corporate expenditure matters little; an
expenditure of any size is a signal about the corporation’s political interest.
Voters’ interests are also particularly strong in states that allow
corporations to donate directly to candidates—i.e., “contributions”—which
are prohibited in federal elections. The Roberts Court has endorsed a very
narrow view of corruption, holding that only contributions, and not
independent expenditures, can give rise to corruption or the appearance of
corruption as a matter of First Amendment law.124 This suggests that
voters’ interests in contribution disclosures are different, and potentially
more significant, than their interests in outside spending disclosures. It
follows that voters’ interests in public disclosure of corporate spending data
is greater in places where corporations may lawfully donate directly to
candidates.
120. Worley v. Fla. Sec’y of State, 717 F.3d 1238, 1251 (11th Cir. 2013).
121. See Noveck, supra note 45, at 107–12.
122. In 2009, in Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 884 (2009), the
Supreme Court recognized that the political interests of a company and the election spending
of its CEO can be so strongly correlated as to be potentially corrupting.
123. See 52 U.S.C. § 30118 (West Supp. 2014).
124. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 357 (2010).
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Voters’ interests in learning about small corporate expenditures are
particularly strong in state and local elections, where a few thousand dollars
can buy significant influence. We know that even large corporations
routinely make small donations to influence state elections. One need look
only to the online database of the National Institute on Money in State
Politics125 to find aggregated electoral spending data from all fifty states,
and details of thousands of small corporate expenditures in state elections,
including donations to candidates as low as $50 from multibillion-dollar,
publicly held companies.126
For example, in 2012, Chevron, Inc. was one of the top donors to a
winning candidate for a seat in the New Mexico House of Representatives,
Don L. Tripp, Jr. Chevron gave Mr. Tripp $500 that year.127 Mr. Tripp
received only five other contributions of the same size in that election cycle,
and only one larger contribution. Chevron’s electoral spending in the New
Mexico election that year exemplifies how small amounts of corporate
spending at the state and local level—as little as $500—can represent a
significant proportion of the candidate’s overall financial support, and thus
is likely to interest voters.
Congress, state legislatures, and state and federal courts have consistently
endorsed campaign finance disclosure of small amounts of spending,
revealing a broad and longstanding consensus that spending of small
amounts is material to voters. At the state level, the most common
contribution threshold is $100,128 and thresholds in some states are quite
low; in Colorado, for example, campaign finance laws compel disclosure of
all individual contributions of $20 or more.129 Disclosure thresholds for
outside spending—the type of electoral spending that Citizens United
addressed, and the only type of electoral spending that corporations can

125. See NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/
(last visited Mar. 25, 2015). The database of the National Institute on Money in State
Politics aggregates electoral spending data from all fifty states, making it possible to track a
particular corporation’s spending across multiple states.
126. See Chevron Corp. Contributions to Tim Sbranti, NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN STATE
POLITICS,
http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?f-core=1&c-t-eid=23421183&deid=566#[{1|gro=d-id (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (listing $50 donation from Chevron Corp.
on June 24, 2013 to support Tim Sbranti, a candidate for the Assembly of Concord,
California). Interestingly, at the original oral argument in Citizens United, Citizens United’s
own lawyer seemed to concede that the film at the center of the case was funded, in part, by
many small corporate donations, and that this fact was obscured by the record in the case.
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 (No. 08-205), 2009 WL
760811 (Theodore B. Olson stating that “it’s possible that corporations throughout America
were giving small amounts of money to [the film]. [The] record doesn’t establish one way
or the other”).
127. See Chevron Corp. Contributions to Don L. Tripp, Jr., NAT’L INST. ON MONEY IN
STATE POLITICS, http://www.followthemoney.org/show-me?f-core=1&c-t-eid=13004424&deid=566#[{1|gro=d-id (last visited Mar. 25, 2015). According to the National Institute on
Money in State Politics, Chevron has given Representative Tripp a total of $1500 over three
elections and is currently ranked seventeenth on the list of his top contributors. Id.
128. Johnstone, supra note 96, at 226.
129. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-108(1)(a)(I) (West 2013); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-915(A)(3)(a) (Supp. 2013) ($50 threshold).

2015]

VOTER PRIMACY

2685

engage in to influence a federal election—are higher, but still low.130
Although the tide among legal academics has recently turned against
disclosure of low-dollar spending,131 the practice of Congress and state
legislatures over many decades has been to provide fairly granular
campaign finance information to voters.
2. Shareholder Materiality
In a corporation, the shareholder plays what has been described as a
“subordinate” governance role that primarily involves monitoring
management—the board of directors and the officers—and then “voting,
selling, [or] suing” to prevent managers from neglecting their duties or
expropriating corporate resources for their own personal benefit.132
Shareholders need information about corporate operations to fulfill this
monitoring role; if they fail in their efforts to monitor, the return on their
investments will be reduced.133
The federal securities laws require reporting companies to disclose all
material information to investors, including material information about the
company’s finances and operations. Under SEC rules, information is
material if “there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would
attach importance [to the information] in determining whether to purchase”
the company’s stock.134 Although the SEC and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board have disclaimed a particular quantitative threshold in
determining what is material,135 amounts in the range of 5 percent of net
income or total assets are generally understood to be in the materiality

130. For example, under Colorado law, anyone who donates $1000 or more to an
independent expenditure committee (a super PAC) must file an independent expenditure
donor report directly with the state. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-45-107.5(9).
131. See, e.g., Kang, supra note 118, at 1720 (summarizing views of “prominent
commentators” and agreeing with them that “there is little or no voter information to be
gained from disclosure from average, low-level contributors”); Noveck, supra note 45, at
103 (“[R]equiring an overload of information may obscure certain connections and cause
important information to go overlooked.”).
132. Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87
S. CAL. REV. 1359, 1366 (2014).
133. See id.
134. 17 C.F.R. § 230.405 (2013); see also TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449 (1976) (stating that information is material if there is “a substantial likelihood that
the . . . fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly
altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”); SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No.
99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150, 45,151 (Aug. 19, 1999) (stating that information is material “if
there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it important”); FIN.
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 8:
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING 17 (2010) [hereinafter FASB 8],
available
at
http://www.fasb.org/jsp/FASB/Document_C/DocumentPage?cid=
1176157498129&acceptedDisclaimer=true (“Information is material if omitting it or
misstating it could influence decisions that users make on the basis of the financial
information of a specific reporting entity.”).
135. See SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 45,151; FASB 8, supra
note 134 (“[T]he Board cannot specify a uniform quantitative threshold for materiality or
predetermine what could be material in a particular situation.”).
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ballpark.136 The larger an expenditure is, the more likely it is to be material
to investors. Thus, very small amounts of spending that lack any other
indicia of qualitative materiality137 are likely not material to shareholders.
This conclusion is strongly corroborated by the disclosure practices of
public companies, which generally do not report their electoral expenditures
in their filings with the SEC. Some public companies voluntarily disclose
their political expenditures on their websites,138 and in virtually all cases the
voluntary disclosures reveal expenditures that fall well below 5 percent of
net income or total assets.139 The widespread practice of not reporting
electoral spending in SEC filings, and the low levels of companies’
voluntarily disclosed spending, suggest a broad consensus among lawyers,
accountants, and the SEC, that expenditures of this size are not material to
shareholders.
Shareholder materiality also differs from voter materiality because
shareholder interests in corporate spending remain the same regardless of
the type or location of the election. This is because shareholder interests
turn on the size of the expenditure in proportion to the company’s overall
financial condition and not on the amount of spending necessary to
influence a particular election. Shareholders of a company with $10 billion
in annual net income are unlikely to care about a $10,000 corporate
expenditure, regardless of whether it constitutes a minor donation to a
federal super PAC or the largest donation in a state ballot initiative contest.
The political expenditures of Chevron in 2012 provide an example of
how investor materiality plays out for large, politically active, publicly held

136. See, e.g., SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. at 41,151 (“The use of
a percentage as a numerical threshold, such as 5%, may provide the basis for a preliminary
assumption that—without considering all relevant circumstances—a deviation of less than
the specified percentage with respect to a particular item on the registrant’s financial
statements is unlikely to be material.”). Underscoring this 5 percent rule of thumb, Proxy
Rule 14a-8 specifies that a reporting company can exclude a shareholder proposal relating to
operations “which account for less than 5 percent of the company’s total assets at the end of
its most recent fiscal year, and for less than 5 percent of its net earnings and gross sales for
its most recent fiscal year,” if it is “not otherwise significantly related to the company’s
business.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8.
137. Information about smaller expenditures also may be material to investors if it sheds
light on other aspects of the corporation’s business that potentially affect the value of the
company—such as information that an expenditure was made intentionally to violate the
law. However, lawful and otherwise unremarkable political expenditures that amount to far
less than 5 percent of net income are unlikely to significantly alter the “total mix” of
information already available to investors.
138. See, e.g., Political Contributions, GILEAD, http://investors.gilead.com/
phoenix.zhtml?c=69964&p=irol-contributions (last visited Mar. 25, 2015) (providing
political spending disclosure data of Gilead Sciences, Inc.).
139. In fact, only three publicly held companies made total donations that exceeded $1
million to top-twenty super PACs in 2012. See Sarah C. Haan, Opaque Transparency:
Outside Spending and Transparency by Privately-Held Business Entities in 2012 and
Beyond, 82 U. CIN. L. REV. 1149, 1166 (2013). The average total donation by a publicly
held firm to top-twenty super PACs in calendar year 2012 was $217,352, and the median
total donation was $50,000. Id. at 1165 n.51. These figures do not account for electionrelated contributions to nondisclosing 501(c) nonprofits, however, and thus do not provide a
full picture of election-related spending by these companies.
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companies. FEC disclosure reports show that Chevron gave the largest
super PAC donation in 2012 of all publicly held firms, in the amount of
$2.5 million.140 Chevron also gave $3.16 million to other organizations that
were politically active in the federal election that year, including $1 million
to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.141 Chevron’s political spending at the
state and local level was even greater. The company spent more than
$6 million on state and local elections in California alone.142 Overall,
Chevron spent $6,340,578 on state and local elections in eleven states, and
additional funds on elections in Canada and Australia.143 Chevron’s total
election-related expenditures for 2012 were just over $12 million.144
Although $12 million is a lot of money, this amount falls far short of
what most Chevron shareholders were likely to consider material in 2012 in
the context of the company’s overall financial condition. Chevron’s net
income for 2012 was $26.179 billion.145 Five percent of this amount is
slightly more than $1.3 billion—an amount greater than the total amount of
reported outside spending in the 2012 federal election.146 Chevron’s
$12 million in election-related spending amounted to less than 0.05 percent
of net income for the company that year. The company chose not to itemize
election-related expenditures in its filings with the SEC, revealing the
company’s view that its political expenditures were not material to
investors.
On a per-share basis, Chevron’s political spending in 2012 was
miniscule.
At year end, Chevron had 1.933 billion stock shares
outstanding, meaning it spent less than a hundredth of a cent per share to
influence elections in 2012.147 Most shareholders would likely have
considered these expenditures de minimis with respect to their own
shareholding.148
140. See id. at 1166 n.54. To be clear, FEC disclosures do not report corporate money
channeled through 501(c) nonprofits.
141. See CHEVRON CORP., 2012 CHEVRON CORPORATE POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 4
(2012) (on file with author), available at http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/PoliticalContributions-2012.pdf.
142. See id. at 1–4 (disclosing over $6 million in corporate treasury expenditures related
to state and local elections in California).
143. Chevron’s disclosure report also notes a $20,000 donation to “Better Schools for a
Better Midland,” which is not linked to any state. See id. at 16.
144. The total of all expenditures reported on Chevron’s 2012 Chevron Corporate
Political Contributions report was $12,020,578. See generally id.
145. See CHEVRON CORP., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (2013), available at
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/annualreport/Chevron2012AnnualReport.pdf.
146. See Press Release, Fed. Election Comm’n, FEC Summarizes Campaign Activity of
the
2011–2012
Election
Cycle
(Apr.
19,
2013),
available
at
http://www.fec.gov/press/press2013/pdf/20130419release.pdf (reporting nearly $7.13 billion
in total spending from January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012, including nearly $1.27 billion
in independent expenditures and electioneering communications).
147. See CHEVRON CORP., supra note 145, at 57.
148. At Chevron’s annual shareholder meeting in May 2013, a shareholder submitted for
vote a proposal directing Chevron’s board of directors to “refrain from using corporate funds
to influence any political election.” CHEVRON CORP., NOTICE OF THE 2013 ANNUAL MEETING
2013
PROXY
STATEMENT
80
(2013),
available
at
AND
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/Chevron2013ProxyStatement.pdf. Although the
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Nevertheless, Chevron published a separate, voluntary report for 2012 on
its website, “Chevron Corporate Political Contributions.”149 The report’s
sixteen pages disclosed hundreds of individual payments—to super PACs
and 501(c) nonprofits, as well as to state and local candidates and
committees—but did not total any of the payments, making the document
difficult for investors to use. And although the final report was released
December 31, 2012, long after the year’s elections were decided, Chevron’s
report did not disclose whether the candidates it supported won or lost—
information that might have helped investors understand if the company
was using its political cash in a cost-effective way. All of this suggests
Chevron believed that information about its political spending held little
interest for its shareholders.
Even if a Chevron shareholder had a strong ideological preference that
her money not be spent to promote the political interests favored by
Chevron’s management, she would have to have owned more than $17,000
in Chevron stock before the proportion of the company’s election-related
expenditures attributable to her investment totaled $1.150 And this assumes
the shareholder objected to all of Chevron’s election-related spending,
rather than just a portion of it.151
All of this means that voters are likely to care about thousands or even
millions of dollars of corporate spending that shareholders would happily
ignore.152 It is fair to say that, in the 2012 federal election, all disclosed
spending by publicly held corporations failed to interest the great majority
of their shareholders on a company-by-company basis, while at the same
time it sparked significant public debate.153
For this reason, voters should favor low campaign finance disclosure
thresholds, and shareholders should favor high campaign finance disclosure
thresholds, particularly for outside spending, which is the main sort of

company had supported many candidates for federal office who lost—meaning that several
million dollars of these expenditures were wasted, and may even have harmed the
company’s access to the winning candidates—the proposal was defeated by 96.6 percent of
votes. See CHEVRON CORP., CURRENT REPORT (FORM 8-K) 3 (May 29, 2013), available at
http://www.chevron.com/documents/pdf/chevron2013proxyvotingresults.pdf.
149. CHEVRON CORP., supra note 141. Chevron removed this report from its website
sometime in 2014.
150. This calculation uses Chevron’s year-end stock price of $108.14 per share. At that
price, a shareholder would have needed to own 161 shares of Chevron stock, at a total value
of $17,410.54; on a per-share basis, $1 of the company’s election-related expenditures were
attributable to her investment for 2012.
151. Chevron’s 2012 voluntary political spending disclosure shows that it donated to both
Democratic and Republican candidates.
152. This is not to say that shareholders never care about small corporate expenditures.
For example, a shareholder might desire disclosure of low-dollar spending if such spending
serves as a signal that corporate management is engaged in insider expropriation of the
firm’s political spending. See Michael D. Guttentag, On Requiring Public Companies to
Disclose Political Spending, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 593, 642–45.
153. See, e.g., Reity O’Brien & Andrea Fuller, Citizen United Ruling Opened Door to
$933 Million in New Election Spending, NBC NEWS (Jan. 16, 2013, 2:09 AM),
http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/16/16530772-citizen-united-rulingopened-door-to-933-million-in-new-election-spending.
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electoral spending that corporations engage in. In fact, shareholder
informational interests (but not voter interests) would justify different
disclosure thresholds for corporations than for individuals. In 2013,
members of the South Dakota Senate introduced a bill that proposed
separate disclosure thresholds for business entities that made independent
expenditures in state elections.154 Under the bill as originally introduced,
“[a]ny person or organization which is not a recognized business entity”
was required to disclose independent expenditures of $100 or more, but the
threshold applicable to a business entity was $2000.155 The separate
corporate disclosure threshold ultimately was deleted from the bill that
passed,156 but the fact that it found its way into the bill at all reveals the
competing interests that are influencing the reshaping of disclosure rules at
the state level.
B. The Timing of Corporate Spending Disclosure
The timing of campaign finance disclosure affects its usefulness. This
section uses disclosure timing to explore how voters’ and shareholders’
competing informational interests may be served differently by procedural
disclosure rules. Voters generally need full disclosure of corporate
spending before an election, while most shareholders are not only satisfied
with post-election disclosure, but likely prefer it.
Shareholders and voters differ significantly in their ability to use
corporate spending disclosure. Voters’ main use of campaign finance
disclosure is to inform their decision making at the polls. They can also use
spending disclosure to monitor relationships of influence between donors
and elected officials over time, but voters’ primary means of objecting to
corruption, or to the appearance of corruption, is to vote the corrupted
official out of office in the next election. In their roles as consumers, voters
may even be in a position to hold corporate donors accountable at the cash
register through boycotts. In contrast, shareholders have little opportunity
to hold corporate managers and directors accountable for spending
decisions, and these opportunities generally arise after the fact, many
months after an election. Shareholders who cannot vote in a jurisdiction in
which a company seeks to influence an election have no opportunity to hold
candidates or elected officials accountable. And shareholders are unlikely
to engage in consumer action against their own companies because this cuts
against their financial interests. When it comes to holding donors and
recipients accountable for corporate spending and the influence it confers,
political spending information has many potential uses for voters, and fewer
uses for shareholders.

154. See S.B. 200, 2013 Leg. Assemb., 88th Sess. § 12-27-16(1)(3)–(4) (S.D. 2013).
155. See id.
156. Act of Mar. 20, 2013, 2013 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 67.
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1. Disclosure for Voters: The First Tuesday in November
Voters need to obtain spending disclosure before an election in order to
factor it into their voting decisions. In McConnell, the Supreme Court
specifically endorsed the government’s interest in “mak[ing] the contents of
parties’ disclosure statements available to curious voters in advance of
elections.”157 This means that, in an election year, voters generally need
up-to-date corporate spending information before the first Tuesday in
November.
Disclosure laws have long been designed to provide current campaign
finance information to voters in the days before an election, but they tend to
require swifter reporting of “direct” outside spending—which corporations
rarely engage in158—than of “indirect” outside spending. For example, in
federal elections, up until the twentieth day before an election, “direct”
outside spenders are required to report their expenditures to the FEC within
forty-eight hours.159 During the last twenty days before an election,
“direct” outside spenders must report expenditures of $1000 or more to the
But super PACs must report
FEC within twenty-four hours.160
contributions (including contributions from corporations) to the FEC either
monthly or on a quarterly basis, and in a preelection report that captures all
contributions and expenditures within twenty days prior to a general
election.161 Under this regime, corporate donations to super PACs that are
made after the twentieth day before the election are not reported until after
the election, in a thirty day post–general election report.162 Thus, for the
most common type of disclosed corporate electoral spending—donations to
super PACs—voters can count on monthly reporting, with a final report
twenty days before the election.
Public disclosure can also allow voters (and other members of a
community) to boycott companies whose electoral spending they oppose.
To the extent that voters seek to use corporate disclosure to engage in
consumer action, swift disclosure allows consumers to respond quickly and
thereby discourage the company from making additional, similar
expenditures in the same election cycle. In some cases, consumer action
has caused companies to publicly disclaim their donations or apologize for
them,163 and if corporate apologies are prompted by a boycott, they are
most powerful if they come in the midst of a campaign rather than after it.

157. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 200 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC,
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
158. See Haan, supra note 139, at 1160–61.
159. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.4(c) (2013).
160. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.10(d).
161. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, REPORT OF RECEIPTS AND DISBURSEMENTS FOR OTHER
THAN AN AUTHORIZED COMMITTEE (FEC FORM 3X) 3 (2006), available at
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/forms/fecfrm3xi.pdf.
162. See id.
163. See, e.g., Brody Mullins & Ann Zimmerman, Target Discovers Downside to
Political Contributions, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2010, at A2.
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Thus, timely disclosure not only helps voters make decisions at the polls,
but also helps them vote with their wallets.
2. Disclosure for Shareholders: Proxy Season
Shareholders do not need any corporate spending information before a
public election. Under corporate governance laws, shareholders have no
opportunity to approve or object to corporate political expenditures ex
ante.164 Swift, preelection disclosure of expenditures is thus not useful to
shareholders because they can do little with it, other than divest completely.
Shareholders who want to use the procedures of corporate democracy to
regulate the corporation’s political spending must do so at the annual
shareholder meeting, where they can vote to unseat a director or make a
shareholder proposal directing management to change its future spending
practices. Thus, shareholders need corporate electoral spending information
before the annual shareholder meeting, which at most publicly held
companies is held during “proxy season” in the spring following an
election. From the point of view of shareholders, the most useful disclosure
is not quick disclosure of a series of piecemeal expenditures as an election
approaches, but rather comprehensive, post hoc disclosure that makes it
easy to compare the company’s total electoral spending with its broader
financial operations.
Voluntary corporate disclosures, which are directed at shareholders,
embody this purpose. The CPA-Zicklin Index, which publishes a list of
best practices for corporations regarding political spending, encourages
corporations to make spending disclosures only twice a year.165 Most
corporations that publish voluntary disclosures produce semiannual reports
or a single, annual report summarizing the entire year’s spending
activity.166 This is the practice because this timing of disclosure is userfriendly for shareholders.
Postelection disclosure is most useful to shareholders for another reason:
it facilitates the comparison of the corporation’s expenditures with electoral
outcomes. Even if shareholders care little about the absolute amount of a
164. Iowa’s corporate laws provide a partial exception to this rule. Under Iowa law, a
corporation must obtain “the authorization of a majority of the entity’s board of directors”
for “the use of treasury funds for an independent expenditure involving a candidate or ballot
issue committee.” The board’s authorization must occur “in the same calendar year in which
the independent expenditure is incurred.” IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.404 (West 2012). Since
most corporations chartered in Iowa are non-public, closely held companies, this law
probably functions to require shareholder approval in many cases.
165. See CTR. FOR POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY, THE 2013 CPA-ZICKLIN CENTER INDEX OF
CORPORATE POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND DISCLOSURE 23 app. C (2013), available at
http://www.politicalaccountability.net/index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/i/8047.
166. In practice, corporations that publish voluntary reports often do not make them
public until many months after the last date of the period being reported. Thus, it is not
unusual to see a company post a voluntary political spending report for the period ending
June 30 in December. This practice virtually ensures that, in an election year, shareholders
will not learn about any of the corporation’s electoral spending from the company until after
the election is decided. The practice makes sense, and has caused little controversy, because
shareholders have little interest in preelection disclosure.
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corporation’s expenditures on an election167—as already discussed,
shareholders of public companies are likely to consider current levels of
corporate electoral spending immaterial because the spending is de minimis
on a company-by-company basis—a shareholder may still be interested to
learn if management made cost-effective spending decisions and backed
winners. This information can only be obtained after the election, by a
comparison of total candidate-by-candidate expenditures to electoral
outcomes.168
Although it is probably not what the Supreme Court had in mind when it
wrote about the “procedures of corporate democracy,” shareholders might
also respond to corporate spending disclosure by exiting the corporation—
by selling their shares. This is mainly an option for shareholders of
publicly held companies, and not for shareholders of privately held
companies, because there exists an efficient market for the shares of the
former but often not for the latter.169 There is little evidence that
shareholders commonly respond to corporate electoral spending disclosure
by selling their shares. However, a shareholder who wanted to do so would
probably prefer to learn about the corporation’s expenditure soon after it
was made, both to send a message to management and to cut ties to the
corporation before additional, similar expenditures are made.
All of this suggests that voters’ needs favor timely disclosure of
expenditures as they are made and up-to-date disclosure before an election,
while most shareholders will prefer to receive a single, postelection
disclosure of corporate spending for the fiscal year, months after voters and
the media have lost interest.
C. Other Legal Rights to Corporate Spending Information
Voters depend more heavily upon campaign finance disclosure laws to
learn about corporate electoral spending than shareholders do because,
under state corporate law, shareholders are likely to enjoy legally
enforceable rights to corporate political spending information that voters
lack. Most state corporate law statutes give special informational rights to
shareholders that make campaign finance disclosure less important from the
shareholder perspective. Yet to use these corporate law informational
rights, shareholders generally must safeguard the company’s financial
167. See supra Part III.A.
168. Interestingly, FECA’s advance disclosure requirements might be understood to serve
shareholders’ informational interests uniquely. This is because compelled disclosure of a
corporation’s plan to engage in future political spending gives dissenting shareholders the
opportunity to act ex ante on concerns about that spending, even if it is only by calling
corporate management to register a complaint. In effect, advance disclosure provides
shareholders with some tool (rather than no tool) to influence, through informal pressure on
management, a corporation’s political spending.
169. See Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO L.J. 1207, 1217–19 (2009).
Moreover, privately held entities often impose transfer restrictions on ownership; for many
such entities, limited exit is a desired feature of governance. See F. HODGE O’NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 1:9, at 1-36 (3d ed. 2014).
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information from non-shareholders. Thus, while voters must rely on
campaign finance laws to provide them information about corporate
electoral spending, shareholders have other legal rights to the information,
and they are unlikely to share the information they obtain by right with the
public.
The idea that shareholder informational rights may extend to corporate
political spending data that are not otherwise material under federal
securities law first came to light after the 2012 election. In January 2013,
the New York State Comptroller, a shareholder of Qualcomm, Inc., sued
Qualcomm to obtain information about Qualcomm’s political spending
activities in the 2012 election.170 The New York State Comptroller
advanced a novel legal theory, arguing that section 220 of Delaware’s
General Corporation Law171 gave any stockholder the right to inspect the
corporation’s books and records relating to political expenditures.172
Qualcomm settled the lawsuit by agreeing to voluntarily disclose its
political spending to the public, so the Comptroller’s argument remains
untested.173 However, the plain text of section 220, and Qualcomm’s quick
capitulation, suggest it is likely that Delaware law does give corporate
shareholders a right to political spending information, and that similar laws
in many states do the same.174
State corporate laws that give shareholders an informational right to
corporate spending information likely prohibit shareholders from sharing
what they learn with people outside the company. This is because state
corporate laws generally require shareholders to establish a “proper
purpose” to access corporate information and prohibit them from uses of the
information that might harm the company.175 Courts have interpreted the
“proper purpose” clause to protect sensitive corporate financial
information.176 Because public disclosure of a company’s political
spending may subject the company to criticism and so-called economic
reprisal,177 courts are likely to conclude that shareholders who use their
informational rights to publicize controversial corporate electoral spending
practices are harming the company. Thus, shareholders’ information rights,
embodied in section 220 of Delaware’s General Corporation Law and other
170. Nicholas Confessore, State Comptroller Sues Qualcomm for Data About Its Political
Contributions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at A18.
171. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (2011).
172. See Confessore, supra note 170.
173. See Nicholas Confessore, Qualcomm Reveals Its Donations to Tax-Exempt Groups,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013, 1:46 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/02/22/
qualcomm-agrees-to-reveal-donations-to-tax-exempt-groups/.
174. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.1602(3) (West 2007); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT
§ 16.02(c)(1)–(3) (2013).
175. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c).
176. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas, Improving Shareholder Monitoring of Corporate
Management by Expanding Statutory Access to Information, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 331, 368
n.205 (1996) (“[E]ven where the shareholder states a proper purpose, the Delaware courts
will protect the corporation’s sensitive business information by restricting the information
produced . . . .”).
177. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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states’ similar laws, may provide shareholders with an enforceable right to
obtain political spending information that must not be shared generally with
voters.
It stands to reason that shareholders will be satisfied with less exacting
campaign finance disclosure laws than voters will, because they can obtain
corporate spending information from another source. For reasons discussed
in the next section, they may prefer that some corporate spending
information remain outside the public eye.
D. The Financial Interest in Limiting Disclosure
Voters’ and shareholders’ interests in corporate spending information
differ in a fourth important way: shareholders have a financial interest in
limiting public disclosure, and voters do not. Voters require public
disclosure to obtain corporate spending information. It is certainly possible
that onerous disclosure requirements could chill political speech and
thereby reduce voters’ access to information, but there is little evidence of
this. Voters even may be interested in the reaction of the public to
corporate spending disclosures and factor such information into their voting
decisions.
Shareholders’ interests are more complicated. Public disclosure of the
corporation’s electoral spending is often good for shareholders—when
public disclosure serves as a channel for investor information, it allows
shareholders to monitor management and reduce agency costs—but it also
may lead to a reduction in shareholder value.
A shareholder may reasonably fear that public disclosure could subject
the company to controversy or to boycott, leading to a drop in revenues or
even to a lower stock price. In its 2010 Handbook of Corporate Political
Activity, the Conference Board identified political spending as an “area of
potential corporate vulnerability” because it involves reputational risk.178
Ironically, the use of the internet for quick public dissemination of filings
and for database synthesis of disclosure information is helpful to voters but
poses risks to corporate donors, because it makes it easier for regulators and
the public to monitor for violations of campaign finance laws. A
corporation’s violation of campaign finance regulations can result in fines,
as well as reputational harm.179
Public disclosure of a company’s political expenditures may, in some
circumstances, reveal the company’s business strategy to competitors.180
For example, a retailer might not want competitors to know that it has
begun spending money to support candidates in an area where it has no
stores, because this could indicate the retailer’s intention to open a store
178. CONFERENCE BD., HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITY: EMERGING
GOVERNANCE ISSUES 17 (2010), available at http://www.politicalaccountability.net/
index.php?ht=a/GetDocumentAction/id/4084.
179. Id.
180. See HEIDI WELSH & ROBIN YOUNG, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POLITICAL
EXPENDITURES: 2011 BENCHMARK REPORT ON S&P 500 COMPANIES 4 (2011), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1959566.
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there. Likewise, disclosure of a corporation’s donations to support or
oppose a ballot initiative can tip the corporation’s hand to competitors about
its plans with regard to labor, taxes, or any number of business-related
subjects.
Shareholders have a financial interest in limiting the company’s expense
to comply with disclosure obligations, such as ongoing reporting
requirements. The costs of complying with disclosure laws can be high,
and involve not only the expense of recordkeeping, but the cost of
monitoring disclosure laws in multiple jurisdictions.181
The concerns raised about the costs of campaign finance disclosure to
businesses in these and other cases are very similar to the concerns raised
by businesses, securities regulators, and commentators about the costs of
disclosure mandated by the federal securities laws. In a speech to the
National Association of Corporate Directors in 2013, SEC Chairwoman
Mary Jo White cautioned that when disclosure “strays from its core
purpose,” investors experience “information overload,” and she suggested
that disclosure obligations should be pared back.182 In December 2013, the
SEC issued a staff report about disclosure to Congress that raised questions
about the usefulness of various types of securities disclosure and concluded
that the issue warranted further study.183 The SEC has continued to raise
concerns that companies may be overburdened by disclosure requirements,
and in some recent instances it has expressly urged companies to reduce
their disclosures to make them easier for investors to use.184
*

*

*

The four examples above highlight specific ways in which voters and
shareholders have different informational needs that are satisfied by
different kinds of campaign finance disclosure. Taken together, they show
that a campaign finance disclosure regime guided by voter primacy is likely
to mandate swift, preelection disclosure of corporate electoral spending,
with low disclosure thresholds for outside spending as well as for
contributions. In contrast, a disclosure regime guided by shareholder
primacy would have high disclosure thresholds, particularly for outside
181. For example, in 2013, in Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576
(8th Cir. 2013), the Eighth Circuit invalidated “perpetual, ongoing” disclosure obligations
that applied to corporations that spent money to influence elections in the state, noting that
they could be “particularly difficult . . . for smaller businesses . . . .” Id. at 596–97 (quoting
Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2012)).
182. White, supra note 20 (“I am raising the question here and internally at the SEC as to
whether investors need and are optimally served by the detailed and lengthy disclosures
about all of the topics that companies currently provide in the reports they are required to
prepare and file with us.”).
183. See SEC, REPORT ON REVIEW OF DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS IN REGULATION S-K
95–96 (2013), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2013/reg-sk-disclosurerequirements-review.pdf.
184. See, e.g., Tammy Whitehouse, SEC: Trim Excess Data from Financial Reports,
COMPLIANCE WEEK, Mar. 2014, at 33 (reporting that SEC deputy chief accountant Dan
Murdock had “called on companies to do what they can . . . to reduce disclosures in the body
of the financial statements and in the footnotes”).
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spending, and summary postelection disclosure. It might even have
separate disclosure thresholds for businesses. And it would be highly
sensitive to the costs of regular recordkeeping and reporting obligations for
businesses large and small.
These competing interests cannot be achieved through the same set of
disclosure rules. Because voters’ and shareholders’ informational interests
demand different types of disclosure, optimal disclosure for one audience
will be suboptimal for the other. The consequence is that, after Citizens
United, lawmakers and regulators who draft or amend campaign finance
disclosure rules that apply to corporations must compromise. Expanding
the audience for campaign finance disclosure to include shareholders is thus
unlikely to lead to more disclosure that is helpful to more additional
categories of stakeholders. Instead, it is likely to lead to a refocusing of
disclosure priorities away from the needs of voters, and ultimately to less
disclosure that is helpful to voters.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF REPURPOSING
CORPORATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE DISCLOSURE
In an election, a nexus exists between whose interests campaign finance
disclosure serves and whose political interests are likely to be advanced at
the polls. If disclosure laws are well designed to meet voters’ informational
needs, voters will be able to easily obtain information they find useful in
making voting decisions, and they will be more effective at voting in a way
that promotes their political interests and policy preferences. Conversely, if
voters cannot obtain information that would help them decide among
competing candidates, ballot initiatives, or referenda, they will be less
effective at advancing their political interests when they vote. Both the
content and the manner of disclosures impact the effectiveness with which
disclosure serves voters’ interests.185 As we have seen, voters and
shareholders have competing interests in the content and manner of
corporate electoral spending disclosure, and since Citizens United has
repurposed this type of disclosure to serve both audiences, campaign
finance disclosure laws will be reshaped over time to satisfy shareholders’
informational interests at the expense of voters.
In this final part, I argue that the Court’s move in Citizens United to
repurpose campaign finance disclosure is likely to have at least three
results. First, it will enhance the political power of a small number of very
wealthy individuals at the expense of lower-income Americans. This is
because stockholding in U.S. public companies skews strongly toward the
very wealthy. Second, in some states but not in others, changes to
disclosure will strengthen the power of shareholder groups that lack any ties
to the community, enhancing the political influence of exclusively profitdriven interests.
Finally, the move to expand the audience for corporate electoral
disclosure may have constitutional consequences for campaign finance.
185. See Mayer, supra note 96, at 259.
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Shareholder interests may increase in importance in the First Amendment
analysis justifying compelled campaign finance disclosure by for-profit
businesses because the Court has been weakening voters’ interests in source
revelation. If shareholders’ interests take on greater significance in the
constitutional analysis and corporate electoral spending disclosure were to
become available via another disclosure channel—for example, through
securities disclosure rules that the SEC is being pressed to create186—the
informational interest supporting corporate campaign finance disclosure
could be weakened or even eliminated. Corporate electoral spending
disclosure could migrate from the authority of the FEC and state election
agencies to the authority of securities regulators, furthering the investorcentric focus of rules governing its form and substance.
Fundamentally, voters and corporate shareholders are different interest
groups. Not all voters own stock, and not all stockholders vote. Some
Americans are both eligible to vote and own stock in U.S. companies, but it
is difficult to estimate the size of this group with precision.187 Recent
surveys have found that fewer than half of adult Americans are beneficial
owners of any corporate stock.188 This suggests that fewer than 120 million
adult Americans were stockholders at the time of the 2012 election. By
comparison, almost 222 million Americans were eligible to vote in that
election.189 Although we must paint with a broad brush, these facts suggest
that the population of individuals in 2012 who were eligible to vote in the
federal election and owned zero corporate stock may have reached as high
as 100 million Americans. Most stockholders of U.S. public companies are
probably eligible to vote in the United States, but only slightly more than
half of eligible voters in the United States probably own at least one share
of stock in a U.S. public company.
These observations tell us nothing, however, about the demographics of
the typical stockholding voter versus the typical non-stockholding voter.
Because anyone who owns even a single share of stock might be placed in
the shareholder category, these statistics fail to shed light on other key
questions: How many shareholders own enough stock of a particular
186. See, e.g., Petition for Rulemaking from Comm. on Disclosure of Corporate Political
Spending to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, SEC (Aug. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Petition for
Rulemaking], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-637.pdf.
187. The author is unaware of any scholarship that has quantified the number of
Americans who are both eligible to vote in federal elections and own stock in U.S. public
companies.
188. See LAWRENCE MISHEL ET AL., THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA 392 (12th ed.
2012) (finding that, in 2010, 46.9 percent of U.S. households owned any stock); William W.
Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV.
489, 515 (2013) (“Stockholding households increased from just over 30% in 1989 to over
53% in 2001 and dropped back to just under 50% by 2010 . . . .”); Alec Tyson, Economic
Recovery Favors the More-Affluent Who Own Stocks, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (May 31, 2013),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/05/31/stocks-and-the-recovery-majority-ofamericans-not-invested-in-the-market/.
189. 2012 November General Election Turnout Rates, U.S. ELECTIONS PROJECT,
http://www.electproject.org/2012g (last updated Sept. 3, 2014). These figures exclude
noncitizen residents of the United States and ineligible felons, and include overseas residents
who are eligible to vote.
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corporation that they identify with its political interests? How many
shareholders have sufficient wealth invested in stock that they identify as
part of the investor class? The identification question is important because
only a small proportion of stockholders are likely to share the unique
political interests of investors, and even fewer are likely to own sufficient
stock to actually influence a particular corporation’s behavior through the
“procedures of corporate democracy.”
Since Citizens United, disclosure rules have become the main
battleground for campaign finance reform.190 There has been increased
legislative activity to enact and amend state disclosure laws, as well as
increased litigation challenging campaign finance disclosure. Through this
legislative activity and litigation, campaign finance disclosure rules are
evolving. Now is the right time to consider critical questions of audience
with regard to our campaign finance disclosure regime.
Part IV of Citizens United must be understood as part of a broad trend in
corporate disclosure that goes well beyond campaign finance law. The
trend reflects deep ambivalence about how we regulate corporate activity
and particularly about who the audience should be for various types of
corporate disclosure. It has emerged because lawmakers are increasingly
relying on disclosure to stand in for substantive regulation of corporate
activity. Yet there is little clarity about how disclosure is supposed to
regulate corporations through private ordering. Does “deregulate and
disclose” work through the disclosure of information to people inside the
corporation—investors—who are then supposed to use the information to
regulate corporate behavior? Or does it work through the dissemination of
information to people outside the corporation—consumers, employees,
citizens—who are supposed to use the information in deciding what to buy,
where to work, and how to vote? Since disclosure cannot serve all
audiences equally well, the substitution of disclosure for regulation of
corporate activity raises serious questions of audience.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act191
(“Dodd-Frank Act”), enacted by Congress in 2010, exemplifies the
disclosure audience problem in the domain of securities regulation.
Securities disclosure, which traditionally has been investor focused,
increasingly is being repurposed to provide corporate information to the
general public. Among its several reforms, the Dodd-Frank Act requires
the SEC to compel public disclosure of corporate information relating to
CEO compensation, resource extraction payments, “conflict” minerals, and

190. See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 96, at 255 (stating that after Citizens United, “supporters
of campaign finance regulation are turning more and more to disclosure rules to police
campaign fundraising and spending”).
191. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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mine safety.192 The purposes behind these new disclosure requirements
have little to do with investor education.193
Regulators’ and courts’ hostility to Dodd-Frank’s expanded audience for
securities disclosure has led some to conclude that the solution is to reduce
disclosure.194 Regulators have asserted that securities disclosure on
subjects of primary interest to the general public potentially “overloads”
investors with excess information.195 In 2013, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia threw out the public disclosure component of the
SEC’s Resource Extraction Rule, and the D.C. Circuit held that the Conflict
Minerals Rule violated corporations’ First Amendment rights against
compelled speech.196 These regulators and courts have succeeded in
squelching the disclosure mandated by Dodd-Frank in part because
Congress did not clearly define the audience for those disclosures.
Ultimately, the problem of audience for corporate disclosure has been
driven by advances in information technology, which make it possible for
intermediaries to easily obtain and report on a wide range of corporate
disclosures on the internet, where new audiences find and use the
information. Thus, campaign finance disclosure reports published on the
FEC’s website, or environmental disclosures published on the EPA’s
website, are easily incorporated into reports for investors; financial and
environmental disclosure information contextualizes corporate electoral
spending information for voters. Information technology advances have
dramatically lowered the costs for shareholders to obtain corporate
campaign finance disclosure information, but it does not necessarily follow
that corporate campaign finance disclosure should be redesigned with the
purpose of addressing shareholders’ informational needs.

192. See, e.g., id. § 953, 124 Stat. at 1903–04 (proposed CEO-Pay Ratio Rule); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13q-1 (2013) (Resource Extraction Rule); 17 C.F.R. § 240.13p-1 (Conflict Minerals
Rule); 17 C.F.R. § 229.104 (Mining Safety Rule).
193. See, e.g., Daniel S. Gallagher, Comm’r, SEC, Remarks at SEC Historical Society
2014 Annual Meeting: On the 80th Anniversary of the SEC (June 5, 2014), available at
http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1370542005031#.VNPvllXF9XY
(describing the “Dodd-Frank Title XV trifecta of mine safety, extractive resources, and
conflict minerals disclosures” as “legislative mandates utterly devoid of any connection to
investor protection”).
194. More fundamentally, because disclosure audiences must now operate across
disclosure regimes to obtain information about corporations, we should expect to observe
what Professor Adrian Vermeule has termed “system effects” in corporate disclosure. See
Adrian Vermeule, System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6 (2009). Put
simply, what may appear at first blush to be a beneficial expansion of disclosure for one
interest group or in one legal regime may result in a loss of disclosure at the system level.
The main contention of this Article—that expanding the audience for campaign finance
disclosure to include shareholders is likely to lead to a decrease in disclosure useful to
voters—describes such a system effect.
195. White, supra note 20.
196. See Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 953 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D.D.C. 2013) (vacating the
Resource Extraction Rule); see also Nat’l Assoc. of Mfrs. v. SEC, No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 14, 2014), reh’g granted, No. 13-5252 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 18, 2014).
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A. Wealth and Demographics
Voters and corporate shareholders are likely to have different political
interests and policy preferences. Stockholding Americans are more likely
to be white, male, and older than non-stockholding Americans, and more
likely to identify as Republican.197 Americans who own stock are also
likely to be better educated and wealthier than those who do not. Stock
ownership in the United States is highly concentrated in the college
educated: 77 percent of college-educated Americans own stock, while only
25 percent of those who have not attended college do.198
Stock ownership skews strongly toward the wealthy. Three-quarters of
Americans with incomes over $80,000 own stock, while only a very small
proportion—15 percent—of those with income less than $30,000 own
stock.199 Wealthier individuals tend to own more stock, particularly stock
owned directly rather than in a retirement account. In 2010, the wealthiest
5 percent of U.S. households owned more than 67 percent of U.S. stock,
and almost 80 percent of U.S. stock that was not held in retirement
accounts.200 Less than a third of American households owned more than
$10,000 in stock, and the great majority of these stockholdings were in
retirement accounts.201
Demographic differences between stockholding Americans (as a group)
and voters (as a group) likely are amplified when we distinguish between
all eligible voters and those who actually go to the polls. Commentators
have noted that a “strong positive correlation” exists between the likelihood
that an individual will go to the polls and her income and education level.202
The content of disclosure may exacerbate this effect, because eligible voters
probably feel more invested in an election when they find the campaign
finance disclosure available to them relevant and helpful. They feel
confident that they understand the competing interests and have the
informational tools to decide among them, and thus are probably more
likely to cast a vote at all.

197. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 188, at 521 (reviewing available data and concluding
that “the modal shareholder is rich, old, and white”); Tyson, supra note 188. Stock
ownership is highest among Americans between the ages of fifty and sixty-four (57 percent),
and next highest among those between thirty and forty-nine (53 percent). Id. Fewer than a
quarter of American adults between eighteen and twenty-nine own stock (24 percent). Id.
198. See id.; see also Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to
2010: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, FED. RESERVE BULL., June 2012, at
28 tbl.6 (in 2010, only 2.2 percent of households whose head had not graduated from high
school owned stock directly, compared to 27.2 percent of households headed by a college
graduate).
199. Tyson, supra note 188.
200. MISHEL ET AL., supra note 188, at 387–88 (noting that “[e]xcluding stocks held in
retirement accounts, the typical wealth holder—represented by households in the middle
fifth—owns next to nothing in stock, just $1,700”).
201. Id. at 392; Bricker et al., supra note 198, at 41 (finding that, in 2010, the median
value of stock owned directly or indirectly by families in the bottom 20 percent of household
income was $5300).
202. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, The Hydraulics of Campaign Finance
Reform, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1705, 1725 (1999).
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Ultimately, because shareholders are disproportionately white, male,
older, well-educated, and wealthy, we can expect that changes in the
content and manner of disclosure that make it easier for shareholders to
advance their political interests will disproportionately benefit these interest
groups. The most significant advantage is likely to go to the very wealthy,
because stockholding skews most strongly by wealth, particularly when we
consider the value of stock owned. Very wealthy individuals share an
interest in laws and policies that tend to entrench their wealth, for example
by lowering tax rates on investment income.203 It is unfortunate that the
Court’s move to expand the audience for corporate electoral spending
disclosure is likely to empower the rich at the expense of the poor during a
time of rising income inequality in the United States. We must therefore
consider the politically destabilizing effects of this expansion.
The political empowerment of shareholders of U.S. companies means the
political empowerment of wealthy foreigners as well as wealthy Americans.
Shareholders are not merely a subset of voters. Foreign ownership of U.S.
equity stocks has grown steadily since the 1960s and stands today at more
than 10 percent.204 Although foreign shareholders are ineligible to vote in
any federal, state, or local election, their economic interests in corporate
profit maximization will be advanced through the American political
process in two ways: (1) as disclosure laws evolve to serve their
informational needs as shareholders, allowing them to take action within the
corporation to promote their interests, and (2) by empowering fellow
shareholders who vote to do so in a way that advances the corporation’s
agenda. Because this is true, we can expect to see a political shift that
favors not only the interests of very wealthy Americans, but also those of
foreign nationals who own U.S. stocks, at the expense of the interests of
lower-income Americans.205
B. Geographic Effects
Stock ownership is also concentrated in certain geographic areas of the
United States. Direct stockholding is more common among households in
the Northeast and the West, and less common among households in the
Midwest and South.206 Stockholding is also much more common among
those who live in urban areas than in those who live in rural areas.207 Even
shareholders who are eligible voters in a U.S. state cannot vote in more
203. See Noveck, supra note 45, at 81 (“[W]ealthy citizens often have a strong incentive
to push for policies that further entrench their business interests at the expense of others.”).
204. Dinah Walker, Quarterly Update: Foreign Ownership of U.S. Assets, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN RELATIONS (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.cfr.org/united-states/quarterly-updateforeign-ownership-us-assets/p25685.
205. For a discussion of the investments of sovereign wealth funds in U.S. public
companies and the possible “strategic” motives of foreign governments as corporate
shareholders, see Hayden & Bodie, supra note 112, at 489–91.
206. Bricker et al., supra note 198, at 29 tbl.6.
207. See id. (finding that 16.6 percent of households owning stock directly are in
Metropolitan Statistical Areas, compared to only 7.9 percent of households outside such
areas).
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than one state; spending disclosures show that many for-profit companies
make expenditures to influence elections in multiple states. When it comes
to state and local elections, because of the diffuse stock ownership that
characterizes many large companies, it is likely that only a minority of
shareholders at a company seeking to influence a state or local election will
actually be eligible to vote in that election. In some states this minority
may be significantly larger than in others. It is possible, of course, for a
corporation to seek to influence an election in a state or locality where it has
no shareholders eligible to vote (and no employees or operations, for that
matter).
This means that some states and local communities are likely to have
fewer stockholding citizens than others. In poorer, rural places in the South
and Midwest, public companies are likely to have few shareholders who are
also citizens or community members. In these places, most shareholders of
politically active corporations are likely to care about local political issues
only insofar as they affect the corporation’s profitability.
These
corporations have fewer shareholders to object if the corporation seeks to
influence elections to pursue profits at the expense of civic goals.
In contrast, in urban jurisdictions, particularly in the Northeast and West,
public companies will experience greater shareholder backlash when they
spend money to influence elections with the single-minded purpose of
maximizing profits, because these companies have a disproportionate
number of shareholders who live, work, and vote in these places. In these
areas, a high proportion of these corporations’ shareholders will view the
corporation’s political activities in light of other civic and community-based
interests, and the corporation’s pursuit of profit maximization will be
mediated by its shareholders’ more broadly based interests. It is also
reasonable to assume that shareholders who live, work, and vote in electoral
areas where their corporation is politically active will pay greater attention
to the corporation’s political activity there.
C. The First Amendment and Competing Channels of Disclosure
The Roberts Court’s recent campaign finance jurisprudence suggests that
the main governmental interest that can justify disclosure laws is an
informational interest, and several Justices have expressed skepticism that
voters have legitimate informational interests in some kinds of spending
disclosure, particularly those that provide source revelation. Shareholder
informational interests provide an alternative justification for laws that
compel disclosure of corporate independent expenditures. Thus, if the
Court’s recent opinions are any clue, it is likely that the First Amendment
analysis of corporate electoral spending disclosure will evolve to place
greater emphasis on shareholders’ informational interests.
If this happens, the constitutional basis for compelled corporate spending
information may collapse if corporate electoral spending data becomes
available through another channel. In fact, the groundwork for this is
already being laid. Since 2011, the SEC has received repeated demands
that it craft political spending disclosure rules for reporting companies

2015]

VOTER PRIMACY

2703

under the federal securities laws.208 If and when the SEC does mandate
corporate political spending disclosure, the important governmental interest
in using campaign finance laws to disseminate the same information will
disintegrate, and campaign finance disclosure of corporate spending may
become vulnerable to constitutional challenge. Challengers will argue that
campaign finance law need not mandate corporate spending disclosure if
SEC rules already serve this purpose, and may further argue that
overlapping disclosure regimes are so burdensome and costly to companies
that they violate the First Amendment. Thus, the final result of expanding
the constitutionally cognizable audience for corporate spending disclosure
in election law to include shareholders may be the end of corporate
spending disclosure in election law. If corporate electoral spending
disclosure were to become the domain of securities regulators rather than
election regulators, it would be governed exclusively by laws designed for
investor protection, and enforced by regulatory authorities who are experts
in, and primarily concerned with, the provision of information to investors.
CONCLUSION
In part IV of Citizens United, the Supreme Court did something
pathbreaking and, ultimately, something harmful to campaign finance
disclosure, and to corporate disclosure at the system level. By suggesting
that corporate electoral spending disclosure laws may be justified, at least in
part, by a “sufficiently important” governmental interest in providing
corporate expenditure data to investors, the Court weakened what I have
called “voter primacy.” Voter primacy is the idea, less obvious today than
it was five years ago, that campaign finance disclosure is for voters, and
should be designed to serve the exclusive informational needs of the
citizenry.
I have argued that the Court’s expansion of the audience for corporate
campaign finance disclosure is not likely to lead to an expansion of
corporate spending disclosure. To the contrary, by pushing disclosure
thresholds higher, disclosure deadlines later, and by heightening the
sensitivity of lawmakers, regulators, and courts to the costs of disclosure to
corporations, this neglected passage of Citizens United is likely to lead to
less useful disclosure for voters. This, in turn, is likely to favor the political
interests of wealthy business owners, here and abroad, above the interests of
average Americans. For this reason, and because corporate and securities
law are the proper domains for investor-focused disclosure, the Supreme
Court should retreat from the path of Citizens United. Voter primacy has
long guided the design of our campaign finance laws, as well as their
judicial review under the First Amendment, and it should continue to do so.

208. See, e.g., Letter from Seventeen U.S. Senators to Mary Jo White, SEC Chair (Jan. 9,
2014),
available
at
http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/
Senate%20Letter%20to%20SEC%20on%20Political%20Spending%20Disclosure%20Reg%
20Agenda%202014-01-09.pdf; Petition for Rulemaking, supra note 186.

